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Abstract
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) changed the national discussion about who is the decisionmaker in healthcare delivery – physicians or others that pay the bill. The federal government is
the largest payer of healthcare services while states are responsible for implementing the ACA’s
features. Through the ACA, the federal government endorsed non-physician primary care by
advanced practice registered nurses (APRN). The research question of this study is: Why do
some primary care physicians support independent autonomous practice for advanced practice
registered nurses while others do not? The research question should be important to policymakers because physicians are the predominate purchasers of healthcare services. However,
dilemmas facing policy-makers as they adopt and implement the ACA are rapidly increasing
public costs and demands for healthcare services that cannot be met by physicians alone. This
study investigates ideology and PCP support for the ACA as influences on PCP opinions about
APRNs. A web survey was offered to 2995 physicians practicing adult primary care in five
states. Dichotomous groups were established from responses to the study’s independent
variables. Group mean responses computed from questions relating to physicians’ opinions about
APRNs were compared using the independent means t test. Results of bivariate testing find that
ideology, support of the ACA, and whether physicians work with APRNs may influence
physician opinions. Demographic characteristics including age, gender, and race are not related
to physicians’ opinions about APRNs.
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Chapter One - Introduction
The research question for this study is: “Why do some primary care physicians support
independent autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not?”
The aim of the study is to determine if relationships exist that suggest influences on physician
opinions about a specific policy related to health reform, independent autonomous (IA) practice
for advanced practice registered nurses (APRN). Influences on physician opinions may originate
from a range of sources including institutional influences from legislation and its adoption, other
actors in the legislative and care delivery system, and the internalized beliefs of the physician
(Kingdon, 2011; Ostrom, 1990; Sabatier, 1986; Schlager, 1995). The study looks at two possible
influences on physicians’ opinions that may underpin their decision to support IA APRNs or not:
1) their ideology and, 2) their support for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(P. L. 111-148, as amended) or Affordable Care Act (ACA) as it is popularly known.
Collective choice theory is the primary frame of reference for the study’s research
question (Ostrom, 1990). The unit of analysis in this study is the individual physician. Individual
physicians are members of one or more groups of peers who share membership in a collective
based primarily on their status to practice medicine. A collective is a group of individuals who
share benefits of membership through the collective and are motivated through membership to
behave in specific ways (Olson, 1965, p. 33). Members of the collective are “jointly affected” by
actions based on a common set of objectives and/or incentives from the collective (Ostrom,
1990, p. 38). In this study, the physician collective is licensed physicians who practice medicine
as primary care physicians (PCP).
Members of the physician collective are appropriators of collective goods, common pool
resources, who then through their role provide them to eligible members of a community through
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a principal-agent relationship (Ostrom, 2005, p. 27; Bohren, 1998, p. 748). In this study, the
collective good is reimbursement. Reimbursement is available to the physician collective
because physicians are licensed to provide medical services and thus are eligible to receive
reimbursement for rendering those services. Reimbursement is allocated to physicians based on
the eligibility of their patients to receive medical services through a legislated entitlement and/or
an explicit contract such as a health insurance policy (Stafford and Yale, 2013). It is important to
note that reimbursement is allocated to physicians and not negotiated. Arrangements by
physicians to receive reimbursement is through a contract with a payer to perform certain types
of services for a fixed fee per service which is also known as fee-for-service (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.).
Ostrom (1990, p.52) refers to the rules associated with membership in a collective as
“collective choice rules.” Collective choice rules define how day-to-day decisions/behaviors or
operational choices are expected to be carried out by members of the collective and are often
related to collective goods, the common pool resource (CPR) (Ostrom, 1990). Collective choice
is defined as decisions and/or actions taken by an individual in a situation that are “governed” by
the rules, norms, incentives, and/or penalties of the collective (Ostrom, 1990, p. 140-141).
Collective choice theory is a theory of how individuals use rules to “make choices among
alternatives” (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2005, p 33). The conceptual frameworks Institutional
Analysis Development (IAD) (Ostrom, 2005; Polski and Ostrom, 1999) and Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1988; Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008) in conjunction with
collective choice theory are used to help understand the possible relationships between the study
variables in the health policy action arena (Schlager, 1995). In care delivery, the health policy
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arena is the physician-patient encounter (Ostrom, 1990). Health policy identifies the behavioral
scope for physician stakeholders in the physician-patient encounter (Ostrom, 2005).
Context of the Investigation
The physician opinions of interest in this study are those that are associated with
physician support for public policy about APRNs. Physician opinions about APRNs determine
the circumstances under which physicians will support the policy or not (Ostrom, 2011; Weible,
Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). Physician support for APRNs’ IA practice is important for
successful implementation of APRN policy because physician leadership is needed to transition
the policy arena from the status quo to the reformed care delivery system (Angood and Birk,
2014).
Why physicians’ opinions matter in the development of health reform policy may not be
completely obvious to policy makers. Physicians are perhaps the most important collective of
health policy stakeholders because they not only control which health care services are
purchased, but they also direct the consumption of services and products by their patients
(Enthoven and Singer, 1999). There are suggestions that physician opinions may not have been
adequately addressed to assure successful policy adoption under the Affordable Care Act
(Deloitte, 2015a). During development of the ACA, many considerations were offered regarding
potential policy responses to rising chronic disease prevalence, an aging population, and the
efficacy of traditional fee-for-service reimbursement as a continuing business model (Angood
and Birk, 2014).
A Rand Corporation study on healthcare financing, completed prior to federal health
reform in 2010, urged physicians to engage in “new” business practices. Rand advocated an
expansion of the capabilities of the primary care system, in part to meet services demand that is
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expected to grow throughout the current decade and in part to slow the growth of related costs
(Eibner, Hussey, Ridgely, and McGlynn, 2009, p. 6). In a brief to lawmakers, the National
Council of State Legislatures also recommended the implementation of care delivery models
where physicians share patient responsibilities with different types of care providers through
centralized delivery systems (National Council of State Legislatures, 2011). The Bi-partisan
Policy Center made policy recommendations to change the reimbursement and payment models
for physicians and also supported care delivery in the primary care system by non-physicians
(Daschle, Domenici, Frist, and Rivlin, 2013). While seemingly targeted at the physician
collective, many of the ACA policy development recommendations were actually “policy
preferences” from interest groups not associated with direct clinical care (Arnold, 1990, p. 13;
Gruber, 2011b, p. 4-5).
Recommendations to supplement the physician workforce, use new business models, and
change reimbursement strategies for physicians were incorporated in the ACA (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2013). However, individual physicians have been reluctant to wholeheartedly
support changes to their scope-of-practice and accept any associated economic risks through a
shift from the status quo fee-for-service (FFS) business model to new payment and business
models specified in the ACA (Deloitte, 2015a; Merritt Hawkins, 2014). It appears to some
investigators that physicians are not fully engaged by policy-makers to support specific health
policy adoption and may choose individual self-interest over public interest in response to
insufficient engagement (Angood and Birk, 2014; Isaacs and Jellinek, 2012; Lipsitz, 2012;
Ostrom, 2005). Individual self-interests are those interests that promote the values held by an
individual and in making decisions the individual chooses alternatives “… only in light of their
beliefs …” that tend to benefit themselves (Ostrom, 2005, p. 33).

5
So, what influences physicians’ opinions about engaging in self-interest behaviors over
“benefits” to a common good? After all, patients and policy-makers intuitively believe that health
policy is supposed to represent the common needs and best interests of the public (Bodenheimer
and Grumbach, 2012; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). The present study investigates two possible
influences on physician opinions about backing health policy for independent autonomous (IA)
practice by advanced practice nurses (APRN). The study’s dependent variable is PCP opinions
about APRNs. One of the independent variables and one of the two key concepts in the study is
ideology. Ideology is measured on a polar scale from liberal to conservative for each respondent
and relates to the PCP’s core beliefs as an influence on their opinions (Sabatier, 1988). Ideology
as a core belief may influence physician opinions about supporting changes to the status quo or
not, even in the face of objective evidence to the contrary (Edelman and Crandall, 2012;
Sabatier, 1988). In the current study a change in the status quo is the support of IA APRNs.
Another independent variable in the current study and the second key concept is support
for ACA reform legislation. Support for health reform through the ACA is measured in terms of
PCPs who support the ACA and PCPs who do not support the ACA. Federal health reform from
the ACA may influence physician opinions about changes in the status quo because of its “topdown” rather than collaborative approach to changing physician practice patterns, reimbursement
and payment amounts, and services that are eligible for reimbursement; topics that are important
to the self-interests of physicians (Bhuyan, Jorgensen, and Sharma, 2010; Friedberg, Chen,
White, Jung, Raaen, Hirshman, Hock, Stevens, Ginsburg, Casalino, Tutty, Vargo, and Lipinski,
2015; Sabatier, 1986).
The influences of ideology and legislated reform may be essential in forming physicians’
support for policy adoption that benefit the common good over physician self-interests (Gruen,
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Campbell, and Blumenthal, 2006). Through an understanding of the strength of influence from
ideology and support for reform, health policy makers may be able to more effectively
implement legislation that better meets the needs of their states. In addition, policy-makers might
be able to more efficiently engage physicians to compromise in support of changes to the care
delivery status quo that reduces program costs and increases access to services.
Characterization of Health Policy and Physician Collective Choice
Health policy is most frequently focused on issues surrounding the costs of care delivery
which operationally is related to the way physicians practice medicine, physician incomes, and
government budget outflows (Jost, 2012; National Council of State Legislatures, 2011; Patel and
Rushefsky, 2014). Current health policy is largely intended to moderate patient-care consumption
and physician collective choice behaviors about what services are necessary in any given care
situation (National Council of State Legislatures, 2011; World Health Organization, 2010).
Physician collective choice in the care delivery policy arena refers to the range of preferences
from which an individual physician chooses when making a decision to select one treatment over
another through a comparison between “… status quo rules and an altered set of rules” (Olson,
1965; Ostrom, 1990, p. 142, Ostrom, 2005, p. 45). The economic consequences from patient
consumption and physician collective choice begin with physician-patient encounters and are
subject to legal authority granted exclusively to physicians by a multitude of federal, state, and
local legislation (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2005).
Legislatures and their endorsed medical governance institutions, including state medical
boards and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) among others, attempt to
shape physician collective choice about what is necessary and reasonable care. These
institutional actions are deemed proper in order to regulate economic and political outcomes
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from physician decisions and patient behaviors that require reimbursement from public funds
(Boufford and Lee, 2001). The clinical decisions made by physicians enable patient and payer
spending actions through reimbursement for the services provided at the point-of-care. State and
Federal reimbursement for health services is a cost to government payers, typically with little
offsetting revenue, and is projected by nearly every authority to continue growing in double
digits at least through the next decade (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Patel and Rushefsky,
2014; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014).
Patient-care decisions about which clinical treatments to employ are collective choice
decisions historically influenced by the status quo of clinical experience and peer-based best
practices (Ostrom, 2005; Robertson, Rose, and Keselheim, 2012). However, care decisions are
increasingly being made based on policy mandates that may or may not be related to clinical
evidence, but are driven instead by cost and price controls related to treatments and specific
services (Angood and Birk, 2014; Friedberg, Chen, White, Jung, Raaen, Hirshman, Hock,
Stevens, Ginsburg, Casalino, Tutty, Vargo, and Lipinski, 2015). In the case of policy that
purports to be based on clinical evidence, physician collective choice still may not support
prevailing policy, especially if the policy mandates the way physicians are expected practice
medicine (Friedberg et. al., 2015). Without physician support of policy at the point-of-care, it is
difficult to achieve the desired policy cost containment outcomes when physicians do not engage
in the execution of the policy because in the end, patient-care decisions are their exclusive
purview (Friedberg et. al., 2015).
Symbolizing the Healthcare Market
Healthcare in the U.S. is a modern anachronism or a paradox through its symbolic
persona. The traditional healthcare market’s persona has developed historically through patient-
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centered care, which is doing what is best for the patient and not being overly concerned with the
economics of care delivery (Agnew, 1890; Jacox, 2009). In the early days of medicine before
legislated demand for standards of services and formalized reimbursement, as in today’s market,
healthcare was primarily provided by the women of a community who did what they could for
the sick and injured. The last resort in the community was to ask for help from the one educated
or apprenticed person referred to as “doc” the country doctor (Agnew, 1890; Randolf, 2009;
Wall, 1998).
Reimbursement for services rendered by the care provider was given by the patient or
their family and judged fair based on gratitude for the effort that produced the type of outcome
expected by both parties. In the 1900’s endearing community concepts such as “the country
doctor” gave way to a more formal care delivery business model where physicians were paid a
set fee for the specific services they provided to the patient. Led by collective-based
organizations, such as the American Medical Association and the Philadelphia Almshouse, these
organizations’ mission was to guide and/or shape the economic, professional, and political
ideology of physicians (Agnew, 1890; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2009; Warrington, 1839). Through the advocacy of these and other policy
entrepreneurs the national dialog about “public” medical care was forever changed and care
delivery became formalized with physician decision-making related to reimbursement as “… the
driving force in the healthcare system” (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Wolinsky and Brune,
1994, p.44).
Today, third parties reimburse care providers on behalf of patients and operate as both
patient and physician advocates to define the consumption relationships amongst all stakeholders
in the healthcare market (Friedberg, et. al., 2015; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014). The
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third-party payers, insurance companies, employers, and state and Federal government, allocate
reimbursement resources annually based on population health projections (Ehrenreich and
Ehrenreich 1971; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014; Wildavsky, 1977). The third party
payers govern the equity of care delivery and economic exchanges to physicians on behalf of the
sick and injured based on the specific amounts and services the third party chooses to reimburse
in regulated patient-care delivery models (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Wolinsky and
Brune, 1994).
In the US, healthcare as an industry contributes 17.7% to America’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and that gets the attention of policy-makers and policy advocates for a number of
reasons (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2013; Deloitte, 2015a; U.S. Department of
Labor, 2014). Healthcare GDP includes wages through employment in care delivery markets and
related organizations, state and federal taxes from patient care consumption of regulated and
non-regulated health-related products and services, and manufactured and financial capital
generated throughout the medical-industrial complex (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Ostrom,
2010; Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). In other
words, nearly every citizen, law-maker, and all sorts of other advocates have a vested interest in
how the makeup of care delivery policy will impact their interests, often irrespective of relevant
clinical decisions.
Federal law provides the authority for regulation and implementation of healthcare
delivery to states, principally through the 10th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution (O’Brien, 2008). The governing relationship between patients and providers is
established by state medical boards staffed primarily by members of the physician collective.
Twenty states have separate medical boards for medical doctors and osteopathic doctors, both of
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which are fully qualified physicians (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012). These seventy
groups of independent authority define how healthcare services are provided and by whom those
services can be provided within state jurisdictions through medical scope-of-practice laws
(Federation of State Medical Boards, 2005, 2012). Each state jurisdiction independently
establishes legal practice authority in healthcare, but is influenced by “… state legislators,
medical boards, medical societies, and others who have an interest in regulation of the medical
profession …” (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012, p.3).
Overlaying the interests of state regulators and bringing another vested-interest to
influence the type of care provided by medical professionals are hundreds of private and public
“care adjudicators” (Green and Rowell, 2015). Care or claims adjudicators determine
reimbursement amounts for care based on a claim that services were rendered. Care adjudicators
work for payers and mediate payer financial obligations with physicians. Amounts available for
reimbursement to physicians are typically determined through an annual budget cycle using
population health projections that establish an acceptable medical loss ratio (MLR) (Green and
Rowell, 2015; Haberkorn, 2010). The “acceptable” MLR for reimbursement is the ratio of
available budgeted funds to the payments already provided from the budget (Haberkorn, 2010).
The pool of funds in the budget is allocated to reimburse providers based on the projected
health incidence for that year (Green and Rowell, 2015; Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim,
2012). However, for care adjudicators, the interest is economic over compassionate concerns
about health status (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Jacobson, Earle, and Newhouse, 2011;
National Association of State Insurance Commissioners, 2014; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014).
Adjudication criteria are based on a determination of what is “necessary and appropriate” care,
which is “reasonably” defined and codified by the care adjudicators (Green and Rowell, 2015).

11
Care adjudicators are typically hired by health insurance companies, employers, public payers
such as Medicare and Medicaid, and malpractice insurers (Green and Rowell, 2015; Lee, 2006;
National Association of State Insurance Commissioners, 2014; Robertson, Rose, and
Kesselheim, 2012).
The economic interests of payers is a powerful influence on physicians’ opinions about
the care delivery system especially that of government payers using public funds (Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, 2014). Payers reimburse for care based on their economic
analysis rather than treatment criteria per se (Green and Rowell, 2015). In addition to contractual
arrangements the physician accepts to treat public insurance beneficiaries, government payers
have the power of legislative authority through interpretation of policy to ensure physician
compliance with this payer’s interests (Arnold, 1990; Green and Rowell, 2015). Private payers
rely on contract relationships with physicians to assure compliance.
Often, already heavily discounting their service rates and being second guessed about
clinical decisions during claim adjudication, physicians may resist legislated reforms of their
practice patterns which have the potential, real or perceived, to further change their practice
revenue flows (Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). It is important to understand that
reimbursement is based on amounts the payer chooses, not the amount physicians’ bill for the
services (Green and Rowell, 2015). This institutional arrangement is likely a disincentive for
some physicians to support a wholesale change to the care delivery model (Ostrom, 2005). The
exception to such discounting from provider billing is when the patient is the payer. Patient
payers are obligated to pay the amounts demanded by the physician. With non-contracted billing,
patient payers and providing out-of-network services, the physician has legal authority to collect
whatever they bill or negotiate to collect (Green and Rowell, 2015).
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The Healthcare Lobby as Physician Opinion Influencer
According to the Center for Public Integrity, in 2010 there were one-thousand-sevenhundred-fifty (1,750) registered lobby organizations employing four-thousand-five-hundred and
twenty-five (4,525) lobbyists to influence health reform with federal policy-makers (Eaton and
Pell, 2010, p. 1). The issues supported by healthcare lobbyists in 2010 were broad across the
continuum of care, with some of the healthcare lobby interests either directly or indirectly
advocating for or against opening up primary care scope-of-practice to non-physicians as a
means of cost containment. However, nearly all of the groups lobbying for or against changes to
scope of practice rules, including labor unions, manufacturers, small business, big business, and
government among others, focused on economic issues and changes in the manner of the
physician-patient interaction rather than clinical care issues (Eaton and Pell, 2010; Grubner,
2011a). The policy positions of these groups were often in ideological conflict with the direct
interests of physicians (Gruber, 2011b). Aligning themselves with ideologically diverse groups
may be a disincentive for physicians to support reform because of group differences rather than
the characteristics of reform itself (Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013; Ripberger, Song, Nowlin,
Jones, Jenkins-Smith, 2012). The Affordable Care Act which was passed into national law in
2010 during the Obama administration was possibly seen by many physicians as a challenge to
their legally-granted clinical authority as well an intrusion by an ideologically liberal pro-reform
government into physicians’ self-interests (Bonica, 2014; Deloitte, 2013).
Healthcare advocates are mostly privately organized lobby groups, some structured as
community grass-roots organizations and some extending their organization to include paid
lobbyists (Eaton and Pell, 2010; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). Vested interests in the healthcare
system increasingly support issues related to driving economic and political agendas over “best
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interest” patient-care decisions (American Association of Retired Persons, 2014; Bodenheimer
and Grumbach, 2012; PWC Health Research Institute, 2014). For interests concerned about
strictly healthcare spending around prices and costs for patient consumption interests, which
includes the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the pharmaceutical industry,
and health insurance companies among others, the policy preferences of lobbyists tend to be the
minimization of the range of possible clinical decisions through standardized care guidelines
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971; Enthoven, 1993; Gruber,
2011b; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). Other advocate groups
concerned with patient-centric care behaviors, including the American Cancer Society, AARP,
The Alzheimer’s Association, the American Pharmaceutical Association, and labor unions,
among others, rally around policy to increase patient-consumption in order to maximize care for
the money spent (Enthoven, 1993; Gruber, 2011b). The range of advocacy issues, whether
seeking to minimize or maximize patient consumption behaviors, illustrates an important
paradox that exists today between clinical decisions and economic factors in healthcare policy.
That paradox is the reality that health policy relates to the perspective of who is paying for
services and not physicians’ clinical decisions (Stone, 1977).
The balance between clinical efficacy and cost is defined by third-party payers of care,
reinforced through health policy, and implemented by states through licensed providers of care.
The balance of responsibility to patients in this somewhat convoluted payer-provider relationship
establishes the perspective that physicians are at arm’s length from cost containment decisions
and reinforces the persistent denial in the medical community that care delivery is not a profitdriven business (Angood and Birk, 2014; French, Gilkey, and Earp, 2009; Stone, 1997). Care
delivery in the US is dependent upon two conflicting activities: 1) clinical decision-making and
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2) the self-interests of individual physicians in generating medical practice revenue and profit
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012, Gruber, 2011b; Patel and Rushefsky, 2014; Robertson,
Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). It is this incongruence that health policy attempts to clarify by
exposing the economic relationships of clinical decision-making through a focus on cost
containment (Angood and Birk, 2014; Isaacs and Jellinek 2012; Stone, 1997).
The Rights and Responsibilities of Care Delivery
The historically persistent physician collective and lobby group is the American Medical
Association (AMA) which was established in 1847. The AMA spent at least $20 million
lobbying on behalf of physician interests in the year before passage of the ACA (Bonica, 2014;
Eaton and Pell, 2010). The AMA is a federation of physician collective affiliates in each state
with centralized governance that sets its agenda around issues it deems important (Ehrenreich
and Ehrenreich, 1971; Olson, 1965; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994). From its inception, the AMA
served to preserve the economic interests of physicians and the sanctity of clinical medical
decision-making only by physicians (Wolinsky and Brune, 1994). Later through its endorsement
of Blue Cross Blue Shield Organizations, the AMA legitimized the business and economic
relationships of care delivery (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994).
Insurance and other third party payers keep the economics of care delivery at an arm’s length
from clinical decision-making, but never-the-less which clinical services are reimbursed is a
vested physician interest (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1971).
In the early 1920’s organized groups around issues related to patients’ rights and
professional responsibilities grew in number. A contrast in ideologies came to a head in 19201921 through a dialog that would recur to present time. Liberals supported healthcare as a patient
right. Conservatives supported healthcare as a commodity (Lemons, 1969). Lemons (1969) noted
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widespread industry and physician opposition to care delivery reform and public health insurance
as seen by concerted attacks on the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, an attempt to establish
national health insurance. Collectives of physicians, organized as state medical societies and
under the influence of AMA thought leaders, portrayed federal health insurance proposals and
healthcare reform as an “… imported socialist scheme” even though this act was supported by
notable conservatives of the time including President Harding (Lemons, 1969, p. 781-782).
Organized physicians’ opposition was based on a desire to maintain the status quo of medical
practice while increasing physician conformity to AMA values, including the preservation of
their mutual free-market self-interests (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Lemons, 1969;
Whyte, 1998).
The commoditization of healthcare was essentially cemented in the late 1920’s. Private
health insurance was formalized at Baylor University and supported by the AMA. The Baylor
insurance program is the forerunner of what today is known as Blue Cross Blue Shield
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Reed, 1965; Wolinsky and Brune, 1994). From that time in
history until the passage of Medicare in 1965, physicians as the key stakeholders in healthcare
were fairly autonomous from restrictive government regulation (Lemons, 1969).
With the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1964-1965, the status quo of care delivery
became based on the volume of services provided by physicians and government-assured
reimbursements (Colombotos, 1969). Healthcare costs then began escalating out of control
primarily due to care delivery based on status quo fee-for-service reimbursement (Office of the
President, 2013). State implementations of national health policies began to compete with other
social programs for funding and resulted in budget challenges for most states (Office of the
President, 2013). From the 1970’s to present, the demand for services began to grow beyond the
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ability of the physician establishment to adequately provide access to care delivery services
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Green, Savin, and Lu, 2013; Gruber, 2011a; Patel and
Rushefsky, 2014). Rising costs, increasing patient demand, not enough physicians to provide
care, and the implementation requirements of the ACA created a need for states to seek care
delivery solutions outside of the traditional care delivery models (Green, Savin, and Lu 2013
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013a).
Care Delivery by Non-Physicians for Cost Containment
State governments have at their disposal at least one solution to control and reduce high
healthcare costs in primary care settings while increasing access to services for their constituents
under the ACA. The solution involves permitting independent autonomous (IA) primary care
practice by advanced practice registered nurses (APRN) (Hill, Wilkinson, and Holahan, 2014;
Hoyt and Proehl, 2012, p. 287). IA licensure of APRNs increases the number of primary care
providers in a jurisdiction and provides care services that “… maximize the capacity of the
healthcare system …” for previously underserved patients and their need for services access
(Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014, p. 128).
At the end of 2014, there were nineteen (19) states and the District of Columbia that had
legislated full independent autonomous (IA) scope of practice authority for nurse practitioners
including many of the rights and privileges historically empowered to physicians (American
Association of Nurse Practioners, 2014, Minnesota Nurse Practitioners Association, 2014; Yee,
Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). This suggests that in the states that permit IA APRNs, there
was some support by primary care physicians for changing state scope-of-practice laws for
APRNs. Physicians in general offer positive opinions about APRNs as clinicians, but they have
not widely endorsed APRNs for IA scope of practice in primary care settings (Acquilino,
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Damiano, Willard, Momany, and Levy, 1999; Street and Cossman, 2010; Donelan, DesRoches,
Dittus, and Buerhaus, 2013). Physicians, particularly PCPs, work closely with APRNs in the care
delivery system and are likely to be in the best position to evaluate and endorse IA APRNs as
clinicians (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012). Physician opinions about IA APRNs seem
inconsistent with the facts about APRN practice given relatively homogenous healthcare needs in
the US. Opinions about permitting APRNs to practice independently vary among physicians and
are often aligned with State Medical Scope of Practice Acts which may support the self-interests
and ideology of physicians more than the interests of patients and the community served by IA
APRNs (Safrit, 2011).
Physicians that choose not to adapt to the dynamics of community healthcare reform with
increased access and lower costs are more likely to exit the business of medicine or move their
practice of medicine to business models other than private practice (Physicians Foundation,
2010). Under Federal legislation from the ACA, physician and APRN independent practice
together is projected to meet the growing demand for services and provide greater patient access
to more primary care services in their communities (Mathews and Brown, 2013; Oliver,
Pennington, and Reville, 2015). These joint practice characteristics in the reformed healthcare
market beg the question of why do some primary care physicians support IA APRNs while others
do not.
APRNs practicing IA primary care is a change in the care delivery system promoted by
national health reform legislation from the ACA, but left to states to adopt or not. Physicians are
slow to adapt to reform of the care system under the ACA. The ACA specifies reform through a
focus on cost containment and changes to the structure of the care delivery system including
adding new business models and provider types (Connors and Gostin, 2010, p. 5; Hoyt and
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Proehl, 2012). Physicians in primary care have been made aware through advocacy groups that
the provisions of the ACA may benefit other stakeholders, including APRNs, over PCPs (Porter
and Lee, 2013). Physicians are also aware that by continuing to practice under the status quo feefor-service reimbursement model, their incomes will be reduced through cost controls and
payment reform while simultaneously experiencing reductions in their clinical decision-making
authority (American Medical Association, 2010; Lathrop and Hodnicki, 2014; Mathews and
Brown, 2013). The ACA is politically divisive legislation with Americans nearly evenly divided
over the ideological issues associated with the details of reform under the act (Doherty and
Tyson, 2014). Physicians, like the public in general, may have developed negative opinions
about the legislated ACA reforms for reasons other than empirical facts related to certain social
benefits. On this basis, some physicians remain steadfast in their opposition to the inevitable
changes in the way healthcare is practiced in the US (Merritt Hawkins, 2014).
In the reformed primary care system, APRNs are poised through education, skill and
demonstrated competence to be more than physician extenders as they are often characterized by
the physician community (American Medical Association, 2009; Lathrop and Hodnicki, 2014).
APRNs at the level of their education can provide the same types of care and services in the
primary care delivery system as physicians with the same quality outcomes at a lower cost (Link,
Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014; Mathews and Brown, 2013). Despite the legislated reform from the
ACA and demonstrated value from APRN practice, physicians who could gain economically and
politically through an equal partnership with APRNs have not widely endorsed independent
autonomous practice by APRNs (Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Naylor and Kurtzman, 2010). State
policymakers whose budgets are being strained to deficit by rising healthcare costs are
increasingly not waiting for physicians to support the independent autonomous primary care
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practice of nurse practitioners and are legislating changes to state scope-of-practice laws over the
concerns of their states’ physician collectives (Merritt Hawkins, 2014; National Conference of
State Legislatures, 2013). In states that have changed scope-of-practice laws to favor APRN IA
practice, the results of those policy implementations are generally positive through increased
access and lower costs (Conover and Richards, 2015; Oliver, Pennington, and Reville, 2015).
Study Purpose
The research question for this study is “Why do some primary care physicians support
independent autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not?”
The purpose of this study is to assess if ideology and PCP support for the ACA are associated
with why some physicians support policy for IA APRNs and some do not. The study also
characterizes the relationship of respondent’s age, gender, years in practice since residency, how
often they work with APRNs, and their role in their affiliated care delivery organization to
physician opinions about APRNs.
Policy-makers may discover the study findings useful in constructing state health policy
about APRN practice that is meaningful to PCPs in their jurisdictions. The study findings may
also assist policy makers in promoting social change to PCPs in ways that encourage
compromise in reform of primary care delivery models that are required by federal legislation.
Insights into correlates of physician opinion may additionally enhance consumer understanding
of APRN policy’s benefits and risks while increasing the likelihood of receiving endorsement for
APRN policy from elected legislators.
IA APRN practice may be attractive to state budget authorities and legislators in
controlling costs and improving access to services (Cassidy, 2012; Institute of Medicine, 2011;
Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan, 2014; National Conference of State
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Legislatures, 2013; Wiysonge and Chopra, 2008). Through a better understanding of the
influences on PCP’s opinions about IA APRNs, policy makers can make informed decisions
about the policy context for IA APRNs while soliciting professional support from physicians of
all practice types for the implementation of policy related to IA APRNs’ scope of practice
authority. The assumption underlying this study is that if it is possible to measure the influences
on physicians’ opinions about APRN policy, then it is likely that successful policy
implementation can be predicted in some circumstances. If this assumption is plausible, then
policy-makers can use this knowledge during policy development and possibly better serve the
interests of physicians, patients, and other stakeholders.
Contribution to the Body of Knowledge
This study is bringing together previously independent insights, motivations, and/or
influences from other studies on PCP opinions about APRNs (Acquilino, Damiano, Willard,
Momany, and Levy, 1999; Dimock, Doherty, Kiley, and Krishnamurthy, 2014; Donelan,
DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus, 2013; Huntoon, K., McCluney, C., Scannell, C., Wiley, E.,
Bruno, R., Andrews, A, & Gorman, P., 2011; Jackson Health Care, 2012; Street and Cossman,
2010). The opinions of PCPs as health policy stakeholders are important to policy makers when
considering changes to APRN scope-of-practice laws. PCPs represent a key sub-population of
physicians who professionally associate with APRNs in ways that may be different from other
physician specialists (Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014). PCP leadership is needed to re-frame the
delivery system around the requirements of health reform in ways that successfully re-define
physician self-interest in line with change that maximizes all stakeholder interests as much as
possible.
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The current study is unique for four reasons compared to other studies that have looked at
physician opinions about APRNs. First, the study population includes only PCPs rather than
including other specialists with possibly different APRN practice experiences. Secondly, the
PCPs in the study practice adult primary care, which is the patient population with the highest
expected rate of growth through 2030 (United Healthcare Center for Health Reform &
Modernization, 2014). Third, physician ideology has not been considered as a primary influence
on opinions about APRNs, but has been shown to be a socio-political determinant for who does
what in healthcare (Jacox, 2009). And, fourth, the study assesses whether PCPs’ support of the
ACA is related to their opinions about APRNs.
The study research question considers the lack of accord between physician support of IA
APRNs and empirical evidence of its social benefit. In the face of this discordance, the study
considers the possibility that ideology and support for the ACA are factors of influence on PCP
opinions about IA APRNs. There is a great deal of evidence supporting the practicality of APRN
practice as one part of the solution to address the inability of the traditional physician-led
primary care system to control costs and expand access to care. Very little empirical evidence to
the contrary exists outside of that produced through the physician lobby to suggest that IA
APRNs would not meet these unmet social needs. Given the strength of evidence toward the
likely success of APRN as primary care providers it seems reasonable to speculate that intrinsic
factors may be holding sway over physicians’ opinions about IA APRNs. In other studies,
ideology and support for the ACA have been shown independently to influence physician
opinions (Goldman, 1974; Beaussier, 2012; Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman, 2014). This study
looked at both factors in the same research panel to better understand their relationship to
physicians’ opinions.
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Summary of the Chapter
Healthcare cost and access challenges set in motion the possibility of greater reliance on
non-physicians in primary care. The ACA suggests that states should change their scope-ofpractice laws to permit IA APRN practice in primary care. Still, some physicians do not support
IA APRNs in light of evidence that suggests APRN care is a prudent solution to issues of cost
and access. The present study was undertaken to determine the association between ideology and
support of the ACA on physicians’ opinions about APRNs.
Chapter one presented the study’s perspective of the health policy arena which is rooted
in the delivery of primary care services under health reform, generally in terms of preventative
services and chronic disease maintenance. As a point of reference, the historical status quo
perspective of primary care delivery is acute care with fee-for-service reimbursement while
reform legislation calls for services that are integrated toward wellness with payments based on
health outcomes. Chapter two is a review of the academic and professional literature about
public policy, APRNs, issues of health reform, ideology, and collective action based on the
current state of knowledge. Chapter two includes an examination of the healthcare market’s
value proposition about care delivery related to APRNs. The APRN value proposition is included
in order to establish an empirical foundation about the reasonableness of supporting APRNs for
IA practice in primary care. Chapter three describes the research methodology employed in the
present study. Chapter four presents the study results. Chapter five offers an interpretation of the
study results from the perspective of successful healthcare reform. Chapter five also provides a
description of the study’s contribution to the state of knowledge and offers suggestions for
extending the current study in future research.
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Chapter Two – Literature Review and Theoretical Orientation
Introduction
This chapter discusses the paradigms used to establish the perspective for answering the
study’s research question; “Why do some primary care physicians support independent
autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not?” The study’s
review of literature is divided into five sections. First, the value of APRNs in the healthcare
market is considered to assure that IA APRNs are a reasonable policy response to meet ACA
policy objectives. The APRN value proposition is reviewed from the perspective of
implementing APRN policy and changing state scope-of-practice laws. Second, collective choice
theory as portrayed by Ostrom (1990) is examined as a rational theoretical foundation to guide
the study and its research design. Third, the structure and significance of policy arenas (Ostrom,
1990, 2007; Sabatier, 1988) is reviewed to explore how exogenous influences in the physicianpatient policy arena might interact with ideology and support for the ACA to influence physician
opinions. The fourth section of literature reviews physicians’ support for the Affordable Care Act
or not in terms of how physician behavior is manifest from their opinions about health reform
from inception to the present. Finally, literature about ideology as a generalized motivating
influence on physician behavior related to health reform is reviewed.
The IA APRN Value Proposition
The clinical contribution of APRNs in the care delivery policy arena is important to
establishing the value of their IA practice to relevant stakeholders. Independent autonomous (IA)
practice is also referred to as full practice authority. “Full practice authority is the collection of
state practice and licensure laws that allow for nurse practitioners to evaluate patients, diagnose,
order and interpret diagnostic tests, initiate and manage treatments—including prescribe
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medications—under the exclusive licensure authority of the state board of nursing” without
physician oversight (American Association of Nurse Practitioners, 2013, p. 1). IA APRN
practice in primary care needs to elicit continuing confidence from the public, policy-makers,
and their primary care peers. In addition, as states consider scope-of-practice changes, APRN
value should also demonstrate how those contributions “fit” into the framework of the ACA as
meaningful elements of federally legislated health reform. Federal health reform legislation is
adopted and implemented by state jurisdictions according to their unique needs. It should be
significant to policy-makers that the National Conference of State Legislators has a vested
interest in health reform adoption and advocates that the absence of a state’s legislative
acceptance of IA APRNs is a missed opportunity to better control rising budgets and to bring
primary care services to underserved constituent populations (National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2013).
Physicians in opposition to IA APRNs generally express concerns in concert with
narratives from the AMA that if APRNs are allowed to practice IA primary care, they will not
have the skills to identify complications at the point-of-care and patients may die or be
irreparably be harmed (American Medical Association, 2009; Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and
Buerhaus, 2013). The services provided by APRNs in primary care are often more
comprehensive than similar primary care services delivered by physicians or other non-physician
providers due largely to the scope of their professional training (Cassidy, 2012; Wiysonge and
Chopra, 2008). APRNs are able to provide the same or greater quality outcomes as physicians,
but without the depth of diagnostic skills that might be determined by physicians as necessary
during acute care assessment (American Medical Association, 2009; Cassidy, 2012; Institute of
Medicine, 2011). However in similar ways as PCPs refer complex patients to specialist
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physicians through the recognition of needs outside of their expertise, APRNs are trained to
make the same type of referrals both to PCPs and specialists (Cassidy, 2012; Conover and
Richards, 2015).
Primary care delivered by APRNs has been shown to be cost effective in terms of
providing direct care of common acute care presentments such as generalized malaise, minor to
moderate injuries, and most chronic disease maintenance activities (American Association of
Nurse Practitioners, 2013). Primary care by APRNs is also appropriate for delivering
preventative services and managing indirect care by monitoring patient self-management
(Institute of Medicine, 2011). APRNs as primary care providers generate high levels of patient
satisfaction and increase access to care services both in highly served and underserved
populations (Cassidy, 2012; Conover and Richards, 2015; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan,
2014; Tillett, 2011).
Oliver, Pennington, and Revelle (2014) specifically assessed the outcomes from
independent autonomous practice by APRNs throughout the U.S. Their study compared existing
state scope-of-practice criteria for APRNs from restrictive to full-practice authority. They found
that in states enforcing reduced or restricted APRN practice authority compared to IA APRNs
there is an associated lower quality of health status. “States that allow independent APRN
practice have a healthier population than states that do not” often with better outcomes than their
physician counterparts and at least with similar outcomes (Oliver, Pennington, and Revelle,
2014, p. 4). The Oliver, Pennington, and Revelle (2014) study suggests that common objections
(American Medical Association, 2009) about outcomes and quality from APRN care delivery are
not supported through empirical evidence (Conover and Richards, 2015).
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In a related follow-up study, Oliver, Pennington, Revelle, and Rantz (2014) assessed
spending by state and federal jurisdictions on Medicare and Medicaid and found that IA APRN
practice in primary care settings is related to lower rates of expenditures accomplished in part
through effective long-term care from primary care: fewer hospitalizations and lower hospital readmission rates. Positive findings about clinical outcomes by APRNs suggest that denying
APRNs full practice authority in local jurisdictions, especially those with access deficiencies,
low health status, and negative budget impact from healthcare spending may be a missed
opportunity for state legislators to better serve their constituencies (Conover and Richards, 2015;
Gilman and Koslov, 2014). The study states are representative of states with low overall health
status and are deficient in providing primary care services to their constituencies (United
Healthcare Foundation, 2014). National rankings of health status identify Arkansas (overall 49th),
Mississippi (overall 50th), Oklahoma (overall 46th), Louisiana (overall 48th), and Alabama
(overall 43rd) in the lowest positions of those rankings (United Healthcare Foundation, 2014).
None of the study states permit IA practice in primary care by APRNs.
Federal healthcare systems including the Veterans Administration, Community Health
Centers, Indian Health Service, and the US Military permit independent autonomous practice by
APRNs as a means to expand their respective clinician pool and provide greater access to care
services (Morgan, Abbott, McNeil, and Fisher, 2012; US Department of Health and Human
Services, 2013). Medicare permits APRNs to bill for services they provide irrespective of their
autonomous status (Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). However, in states that do not allow
independent autonomous practice for APRNs the fees received from Medicare reimbursement
for APRN service are typically paid to the medical practice that employs the APRN which
increases the cost of the services provided through the practice’s cost of doing business (Gilman
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and Koslov, 2014). According to the National Institute for Health Care Reform, physician
control of APRN practice through employment relationships determines which patients will be
cared for, and determines which services APRNs will provide (Institute of Medicine, 2011; Yee,
Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013).
Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus (2013) surveyed 972 physician and nurse
practitioner clinicians about their respective roles in the primary care delivery system. Each
group of clinicians, physicians and APRNs, were generally in opposition with their counterparts
when responding to questions about whether physicians or APRNs deliver the highest quality of
care, whether physicians and APRNs should receive equal pay for equal work, and whether
increasing the number of primary care providers would have a positive effect on the cost of care
(Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus, 2013, p. 1905). The contrast in opinions between
APRNs and physicians assessed by Donelan, DesRoches, Dittus, and Buerhaus (2013, p. 1905)
suggested that positively influencing physicians’ opinions is an important consideration for
gaining IA scope-of-practice status for APRNs in primary care.
Street and Cossman (2010) surveyed 563 practicing physicians in Mississippi to
determine their attitudes about APRNs among those physicians who work directly with APRNs.
Their conclusion was that “Familiarity does not yet generate enough attitudinal support to
persuade Mississippi physicians that NPs should be permitted to practice independently …”
(Street and Cossman, 2010, p. 437). The authors found that while physicians who work directly
with APRNs generally have positive opinions about APRNs and regard their work with patients
as positive, as a group, physicians in Mississippi choose not to support full practice authority of
APRNs (Street and Cossman, 2010, p. 433). The majority of the Street and Cossman (2010)
study respondents preferred APRNs to practice only under the authority of a physician. Physician
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practice authority is a characteristic of the traditional care system where physicians are the sole
decision-makers and resource appropriators (Reinhardt, 1977; 30 Million New Patients, 2013).
The Street and Cossman study sample of physicians self-identified more heavily as specialists
(59%) rather than PCPs who most often work with APRNs and may as a group have a different
perspective about APRNs (Street and Cossman, 2010, p. 434-435). PCPs are the physician
specialists who are most likely to benefit economically and professionally from a care delivery
system that includes IA APRNs (Matthews and Brown, 2013).
Street and Cossman’s study (2010) used a rating scale containing statements about APRN
practices and consequences; the scale was originally developed and validated by Acquilino,
Damiano, Willard, Momany, and Levy (1999). The same index and question set measuring
physicians’ opinions about APRNs was used in this study as the dependent variable. The
Acquilino et al. study surveyed 259 self-identified primary care physicians in non-institutional
practices to provide a measure of their attitudes about APRNs delivering primary care in Iowa
(1999, p. 224). Both the Street and Cossman study and the Acquilino et al studies computed a
composite score across twelve (12) questions that reflect physicians’ attitudes toward APRNs.
Both studies found that when physicians work with APRNs, the physicians have a positive
opinion about APRNs as professionals and the care they provide, yet those physician decisionmakers in their respective states did not support the independent autonomous practice of APRNs
(Acquilino et al., 1999; Street and Cossman, 2010).
At the time of both studies, there was a large and growing body of literature documenting
that APRNs are as competent as physicians in providing primary care, are more cost effective
than physicians providing the same level of care, and produce at least the same quality of care
outcomes as physicians (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1986; US Department
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of Health and Human Services, 2002; American Association of Retired Persons, 2010; Yee,
Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). Organized physician groups such as the AMA and the
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) among others continue to lobby against IA
APRNs and present counter views to the value of APRNs as IA primary care providers
(American Academy of Family Physicians, 2013, 2015; American Medical Association, 2009).
Theory of Collective Choice
This study looks to collective choice theory articulated by Ostrom (1990) for guidance in
better understanding the dynamics of opinions and decisions made by physicians about
supporting independent autonomous practice by nurse practitioners. Collective choice theory is a
theory about how individuals as members of a group make choices between actions and
behaviors that result in outcomes that either benefit themselves, self-interest, or the larger public
interest (Ostrom, 1990). Collective choice theory considers the influences on individuals from
peers, institutions, the environment, and other factors when faced with a choice situation. In
collective choice theory, individuals who are faced with choices are members of a group defined
as a collective. Choices faced by the collective are typically associated with a resource or
resources that are of interest to the collective (Ostrom, 1990).
A collective is a group of individuals who share a homogeneous and mutually understood
identity that “… transforms individual experiences into collective experience” Mosimane, Breen,
and Nkhata, 2012, p. 347). The members of a collective have shared interests around a
resource(s) and through those interests common experiences and expectations about the
collective are shared through a “collective identity” (Mosimane, Breen, and Nkhata, 2012, p.
350; Ostrom, 1990). In this study, the collective is licensed physicians who practice medicine as
primary care physicians (PCP). Individuals in the PCP/physician collective assume the role of
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“appropriator” of collective goods also known as a common pool resource (CPR) (Ostrom, 1990,
p. 30-31). The common pool resource of interest to physician appropriators in this study is
reimbursement.
Another key concept in collective choice theory is that of the common pool resource
(Ostrom, 1990; Seabright, 1993). The CPR is a finite and subtractable asset which is the focus of
appropriator actions and behaviors, observable in an action arena (Ostrom, 1990, p.32; Walker,
Gardner, & Ostrom, 1989). In this study the common pool resource is reimbursement.
Reimbursement is payment to care providers from payers for services rendered to patients.
Reimbursement, whether from private or public payers, is finite and subtractable, two primary
properties of a CPR (Ostrom, 1990). The Reimbursement CPR is a budgeted entity, meaning it is
finite based on the projected allocation by the payer to make it available to appropriators (Rubin,
2010). Reimbursement is also subtractable meaning that once a unit of reimbursement is
consumed that unit is no longer available for appropriation and the total amount of budgeted
reimbursement is reduced by the amount of that unit (Rubin, 2010) 1. Appropriation of
reimbursement is available uniquely to PCPs because of their membership in the physician
collective. Members of the PCP collective are entitled to appropriate reimbursement from private
and public payers for the services they provide to eligible patient beneficiaries (Ball, 1997).
Patient beneficiaries or “resource users” are members of a community which is a subset
of individual patients in the general population (Ostrom, 2005, p.15). Patient beneficiaries are
eligible and have rights to receive benefits associated with the CPR, reimbursement, through a

1

Conceptually subtractability of reimbursement fits the definition posited by Ostrom (1990, p.
32). However by law public payers must make up any shortfalls from the budget and pay all
legitimate claims for reimbursement. For private payers, the shortfall situation is similar. State
regulators require private payers to maintain reserves as a proportion of their annual
reimbursement budgets to makeup budget shortfalls.
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legislated entitlement and/or an explicit contract such as a health insurance policy (Stafford and
Yale, 2013). The CPR is a private and/or public good in healthcare delivery, depending on the
payer. The CPR brings the physician collective together with patient beneficiaries in an
action/policy arena where appropriation activities occur (Ostrom, 2005).
Eligibility for membership in a collective is based on a specific exclusive right such as
licensure. Membership promotes shared beneficial outcomes through the “interdependence” of
appropriation activities among members of the collective including income earning opportunities
not attainable by non-members (Olson, 1965, p. 6; Ostrom, 1990, p. 38). However, there are
bounded constraints on behavior that are associated with being a member in the collective such
as behaving ethically according to the specifics of licensure regulations, managing the
consumption of resources for the common good, and attaining periodic recertification of
licensure, among others (Olson, 1965; Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). An example of a bounded
constraint through membership in the PCP collective is the right only by licensure to treat
patients and receive reimbursement for those treatment services. Licensure to practice medicine
is granted by state medical boards and is open only to properly credentialed individuals
(Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012). There are substantial legal penalties for nonmembers of the physician collective who attempt to practice medicine in a medical commons.
The concept of a commons is a broad term that is a generic reference to a community
and/or collective with certain rights related to resources (McGinnis, 2011). A commons can
represent the rights to many different types of resources such as fishing rights, oil and other
natural resources, or Medicare and private health insurance reimbursement benefits in the
medical commons (Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 2005). For instance, Medicare benefits which are rights
to seek medical services, are available only to a subset of US citizens who are entitled to receive
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those benefits under law (Ball, 1997). Like Medicare benefits, private health insurance benefits
are another type of rights in the medical commons. Insurance policy members/owners are the
only individuals eligible to receive the specific choices of services, funding, and access to
services offered under common benefits associated with an insurance policy.
Members of the physician collective use the CPR as a means to provide benefit to patient
members of the medical commons. Members of the physician collective have a formal affiliation
with the commons through some type(s) of preferred relationship which is typically a contract
that makes them eligible to treat specific patients (Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services,
n.d.). Physicians are licensed by one or more state jurisdictions, a requirement for collective
membership, and are individually certified to access reimbursement for beneficiaries in one or
more specific patient commons (Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Reimbursements for medical
services are limited by and subtractive from private and public financial budgets, patient access
to the physician collective, and the types of services that are allocated to individual patients
(Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 2005).
PCPs appropriate reimbursement on behalf of their patients which may involve
authorizing related collectives to receive reimbursement through the same or other commons
such as Medicare Part A and Part B beneficiaries. Other types of collectives that have an interest
in reimbursement based on physician collective decisions are hospitals, pharmacies, state and
local government, and clinical laboratories among others who can also receive reimbursement
through physician-patient interactions (Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 1990; Woolf and Stange, 2006). The
collective of provider appropriators in each medical jurisdiction is authorized by state medical
boards that can, with or without legislation, determine which clinician types under what
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circumstances can participate in resource appropriation activities (Federation of State Medical
Boards, 2012).
The common pool resource of the medical commons, reimbursement, is established by
annual government budgets for public medical spending and by private insurance companies
which determine annual limits of reimbursement based on actuarial computations (Hunter,
2008). It is fundamentally these constraints on reimbursement by government and private payer
companies that are incentives or dis-incentives toward self-interest by clinician appropriators.
Other interested stakeholders in the reimbursement CPR, hospitals and so forth, are motivated by
their interest in the CPR to influence physician collective behaviors and/or opinions toward those
interests such as toward the benefits of one drug over another or the quality of one hospital over
another (Hunter, 2008; Ostrom, 1990). Physicians’ opinions about the legitimacy of the
institutionally imposed constraints on their access to the CPR and the influences from other
stakeholders shape physician appropriation behaviors toward how patients’ treatments are
selected and the allocation of resources during treatment (Lipsitz, 2012; Robertson, Rose, and
Kesselheim, 2012).
Appropriation activities for reimbursement resources start at the point-of-care when
provider decisions about patient needs are determined. At the point-of-care, the clinician is sole
decision-maker typically only subject to institutional adjudication of those decisions (Scott and
Vick, 1999). Physician appropriators’ access to resources from the common pool of
reimbursement is based primarily on personal and collective self-governance of their decisions or
operational rules (Ostrom, 2005). Appropriation decisions in the medical commons are also
subject to national governance constraints surrounding the CPR which are termed constitutional
rules and include constraints such as reimbursement payment limits or availability of the
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resource for other reasons. Constitutional rules, which typically result from legislative policy, are
translated into local, state and collective operational rules, and are implemented through state
and local jurisdictions (Ostrom, 2005; Polski and Ostrom, 1999). Wennberg (1984, p1.)
describes the impunity of physician clinical decision-making based on operational rules as the
physician “practice style factor” which is tempered through the institutional governance that
resulted in establishing the operational rules (Ostrom, 2005). Governance surrounding clinical
decisions is achieved through rules that tend to constrain appropriation decisions and behaviors
based on cost containment strategies in the policy arena (Ostrom, 1990; Robertson, Rose, and
Kesselheim, 2012; Woolf and Stange, 2006). Working rules specify which services are available
for reimbursement by the payer (Ostrom, 2005).
Clinical decisions in the physician-patient policy arena are often specified through the
physician collective’s “working rules” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 19-20). Working rules are often
characterized as expected or normative behavior through condition of collective membership and
enforced through procedures such as peer review (Federation of Medical Boards, 2012; Ostrom,
2005). Working rules are also an integral part of each member’s self-interest. Working rules
enable collective-choice decisions associated with reasonable and customary services to provide
to a patient, order on behalf of the patient, and refer to other providers in the practice of medicine
(Ostrom, 1990; Scott and Vick, 1999).
Ostrom (2005) describes the choices members of the collective make during
appropriation behaviors as being challenges to maintaining a balance between self-interest,
interests of the collective, and interests of the commons. Searle (2001, p. 56-57, 124-126) when
discussing the motivation of individuals to engage in rational collective actions, suggests that this
balance of interests is “collective intentionality that enables institutional facts …” such as
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meanings, status, beliefs, and desires, and in essence represents adherence to norms and
expectations of individual behavior. It is precisely the physician’s impunity in making clinical
decisions that is attractive to various types of stakeholders who want to influence the clinical
decision-making process and maximize their own participation in the healthcare policy arena
through association with the physician collective.
Choice-behaviors made by member-appropriators of a collective tend to be based on
decisions that are taken to maximize outcome utility relative to the member’s self-interest or in
other words “…attaining something by means of this membership” (Olson, 1965, p. 6). Hardin
(1969) posits that self-interest related choice-behaviors in the collective will eventually become
the dominant motivation over interests beneficial to the collective and lead to the failure of the
collective in what he describes as the “tragedy of the commons.” Hardin further suggests that
there is no technical solution, that is to say formalized institutionalized incentives or constraints,
which will intervene in the path to destruction of the collective from an over-riding self-interest
(Hardin, 1968). Ostrom (1990, 2005) takes issue with failure of the collective as a fait accompli.
Ostrom (2005, p. 62) suggests that institutional intervention in the form of rational governance
will sustain the collective by regulating/socially constructing the meaning and/or value of selfinterest to be more consistent with interests of the collective and the commons.
Under health reform, interests of the commons are defined as population health
characteristics which through evidence-based medicine produce information to guide clinical
decisions toward the interests of the commons (Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington, 2008; Berwick
and Hackbarth, 2012). Choice behavior in the collective is increasingly influenced by
information from the collective to guide members in decision-making situations relative to the
context of a choice situation and to the benefit of the collective; such as information describing
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behavioral constraints from reform legislation and which services are likely not to be
reimbursable (McGinnis, 2013). Information, according to Wildavsky (1994), is itself a
context-based social construction that is seldom complete, mutually shared, un-biased, and
influences decision-making and appropriation behavior toward outcomes based on personal
opinions and preferences that may be inconsistent with collective interests or interests of the
commons. Self-interest inconsistencies with collective and/or common interests may also be the
result of cultural bias influences that includes individual ideology and level of support for reform
from the ACA (Ripberger, Song, Nowlin, Jones, and Jenkins-Smith, 2012).
Decisions that are based on information available only in the primary care collective,
such as institutional regulations regarding PCP reimbursement and appropriation adjudication
among similar types of information, have come to be influenced as much by individual
appropriator characteristics as by clinical evidence (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012). Increasingly,
prior experiences, influences from opinion leaders, group think, the principal agent relationship,
physician agency, and moral hazard among others, influence physician opinions and decisions.
These influences, asymmetric to the physician decision-maker, often carry more weight than
sources of relevant evidence-based information which seemingly should drive clinical decisionmaking at the point-of-care (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; McGinnis, 2013; Scott and Vick,
1999; Searle, 2001; Stone, 2011).
Incomplete or asymmetric information often results in inefficient resource appropriation
in choice situations; typically overutilization of resources that benefits the appropriators’ selfinterest (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012). The principal beneficiary of the choice outcome, the
patient in the primary care commons, permits the appropriation as chosen by the PCP because
they do not object to or are not aware of inconsistencies in the appropriation. Without objection
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from the patient about the services they receive, the patient consents to the physicians’ decision
and relies on their clinical expertise to make a proper decision that will benefit relevant
stakeholders in the choice situation (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Nair, Manchanda, and
Bhatia, 2010; Scott, 2004; Scott and Vick, 1999). Some medical professionals suggest that it is
the inefficient appropriation of commons resources through the traditional fee-for-service care
delivery system that has necessitated the need for reform of the healthcare system (Berwick and
Hackbarth, 2012).
Healthcare reform from the ACA mandates new constitutional rules for a
(re)prioritization, or rationing, of how commons resources are allocated through cost controls on
services, payment caps, and reimbursement reductions (Ostrom, 2007). The ACA also specifies
changes to operational rules in the physician-patient policy arena which are typically specified
by the physician collective through state implantation of federal legislation (Ostrom, 1990).
Under the ACA some operational rules are implemented through the constitutional level rather
than through state implementation by authorizing of new types of delivery organizations,
accountable care organizations and patient centered medical homes, which through the Act are
authorized and eligible for special reimbursement (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Cassel and
Brennan, 2007; Hiatt, 1975; Ostrom, 2007, Woolf and Stange, 2006).
Collective choice theory predicts that in times of needed rationing through a prioritization
of resource appropriations, such as with healthcare spending controls in the current marketplace,
resource appropriators will be influenced to maintain personal control over the most lucrative
resources that minimize their costs and simultaneously maximize their self-interests over
common interests (Ostrom, 2011). In the medical commons, lucrative resources could be
characterized as appropriations from care delivery transactions that do not require the expertise
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of a highly educated physician professional and are consciously withheld from appropriation by
less expensive methods of appropriation, such as by IA APRNs (Hiatt, 1975). That sort of
collective action by physicians, denial of non-physician access to the commons, serves to
maintain the care delivery status quo (Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Robertson, Rose, and
Kesselheim, 2012). Self-interest actions of this type can be observed in the physician-patient
policy arena.
The Physician-patient Policy Arena
A policy arena is the context where the interaction effects of policy incentives and/or
disincentives are observable. Interactions in the physician-patient policy arena are easily thought
of as separate transactions, but in reality each one is often a set of interdependent economic
transactions (Andersen, 1995). One or more of these interdependent transactions may
simultaneously exert influence over treatment decisions that are made in the policy arena, such
as with diagnostic testing (Ostrom, 2011). All transactions in the physician-patient policy arena
originate from a physician-patient interaction which is the distinct starting point in the CPR
appropriation process. The physician-patient policy arena is where clinical treatment decisions
are made based on collective-choice rules and physicians’ preferences that are manifest through
their clinical expertise. A broad array stakeholders thus have vested interests in influencing the
outcomes of treatment choices made by the physician (Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008).
In health policy arenas, the influences on physician opinions and decisions can come
from a wide range of sources including personal beliefs, business interests, policy actors,
individual citizens, and government (Kingdon, 2011; Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, and Sabatier,
2012). Policy actors are a special type of influence on collective action the policy arena. Policy
actors are often characterized as policy specialists within a policy arena/subsystem and often
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offer expert information as the basis of their credible influence (Weible, 2008). Policy specialists
are typically specific to a policy subsystem and should not be confused with physician
specialists. Policy actors/specialists may impact the beliefs and opinions of physicians and other
stakeholders in ways that influence the way policy is implemented (Ingold, 2009; Sabatier, 1988;
Weible, 2008). In health policy arenas, non-physician stakeholders often operate to influence
physician behavior through advocacy narratives that possibly operate in concert with ideology to
support the status quo or to vigorously pursue favorable implementation in support of their
interests (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Stone, 1989). Many attempts to influence
health policy implementation focus on care delivery transactions in the physician-patient policy
arena.
The physician-patient policy arena operates through a fundamental principal-agent
relationship representing economic incentives directed by physicians (Laffont and Martimort,
2001). The patient as principal is the recipient of the direct benefits of the transaction such as
treatment and acquiesces to decisions and information from the physician-agent (Frees, Gao, and
Rosenberg, 2011). The physician in their role of agent frequently makes all decisions about care
including what services to purchase and how those services will be delivered. Frees, Gao, and
Rosenberg (2011) used the publically available national Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) to assess the predictability of health care expenditures. They found that not only do
patients acquiesce to their clinician about purchase decisions, but they also rely on the payer of
care, insurance companies and government, to assure that services are available to support
physician decisions (Frees, Gao, and Rosenberg, 2011).
The relationship between payer and the type of care delivered certainly seems to favor the
physician’s ability to make choice decisions within the framework of most favorable

40
reimbursement from both party’s perspectives. Mealem and Yaniv (2011) in a study of patient
compliance with treatment regimens suggest that higher physician reimbursement for services
has a tendency to increase the exchange of information between agent and principal which may
result in better treatment outcomes. Conversely the model they applied found that physician
empathy toward making pro-patient choices between eligible services fell as the rate of their
reimbursement fees increased (Mealem and Yaniv, 2011, p. 10). This finding on physician
empathy by Mealem and Yaniv (2011) suggests that economic self-interest is an important
motivation for unilateral decision-making about care delivery in the physician-patient action
arena.
Nearly all care delivery transactions have related advocacy interests seeking to gain favor
with physicians to minimize or maximize the reimbursement on behalf of the patient principal
(Bandura, 2001; Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). All care delivery transactions are
related to physician agency as well as economic motivations. The significance of physician
agency surrounding care delivery and reimbursement decisions is related to induced-demand;
that is to say, the ability to make binding choices about care delivery with impunity (Bandura,
2001; Jacobson, Chang, Newhouse, and Earle, 2013). Economic considerations are powerful
motivations in the health policy arena. They are part of a reward structure for participating in the
business of healthcare which is not only beneficial to physicians, but to other stakeholders
downstream from the initial patient-physician transaction (Enthoven, 1998; Ostrom, 2010).
Such systemic and exogenous influences on health policy and physician opinions is often
obscured to the public and elected legislators’ by a lack of knowledge of how relationships
between healthcare providers and others in the healthcare system operate and are permitted to
interact by regulation (Weed and Weed, 1999; Lipsitz, 2012; McGinnis, 2013). Care delivery
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relationships between patients and providers also create confusion about the characteristics of the
healthcare system and relevant health policy (Gruen, Campbell, and Blumenthal, 2006). Patients
tend to experience care delivery with narrowly focused objective criteria related to the perceived
appropriateness of the physician-patient interaction (Andersen, 1995).
Patients and the lay public in general tend to view physicians as agents always acting in
the patient’s best interest (Scott and Vick, 1999). In reality, patients’ best interest may or may
not be known to the patient. The principal-agent relationship in care delivery is generally how
the lay public understands the workings of the healthcare market (Bodenheimer and Grumbach
2012; Gruen, Campbell, and Blumenthal, 2006). There is a lack of understanding by the lay
public about the significance and the scope of non-professional roles physicians assume that also
impact their treatment decisions (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012; Gruen, Campbell, and
Blumenthal, 2006; Scott and Vick, 1999). Patients want to see the compassionate side of care
delivery from physicians as the only interest clinicians engage in on behalf of patients. They do
not readily perceive physicians’ need to maximize profitability of the practice, to finance their
retirement, and generally to engage in all sorts of economic related behaviors related to running a
business (Scott and Vick, 1999). This selective understanding of physician behavior is frequently
the result of asymmetric knowledge and information regarding what is appropriate during care
delivery (McGinnis, 2013).
Physicians can and do induce demand for their own services in part through their desire
to please patients, such as over-testing to rule out all possible causes of malaise and in part to
serve their own interests (Reinhardt, 1975; Stone, 2011). It is difficult for the lay-public to
understand the risks and rewards of policy that may or may not influence physicians through the
multitude of interpersonal and system interactions involved in care delivery (30 Million New
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Patients, 2013). Without an understanding of the subtleties involved in the depth and breadth of
care delivery, citizens are unlikely to assist legislators through their comment and advocacy in
the development of meaningful health policy. Therefore in the policy arena it is often necessary
for the public and most legislators to rely on subject-matter experts, policy actors, to interpret the
complexities of legislation; such as the case with the ten titles in the 1,100 pages of
specifications of the ACA intended to reform the traditional care delivery system (Bernier and
Clavier, 2011; Forest, 2013; Mebane and Blendon, 2001). As a result of the passage of the ACA
there appears to be a general lack of willingness by physicians to provide patients with nonbiased information about care delivery changes even as it impacts their treatments (Wilensky,
2012; National Public Radio, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and Harvard T.H. Chan School
of Public Health, 2015).
Physicians’ biases through the dissemination of information in the physician-patient
policy arena is experienced by both patients and non-physician rule-making authorities (Scott
and Vick, 1999). Scott and Vick (1999) performed a discreet choice experiment with the public
to determine patient care delivery experiences related to information exchange in the physicianpatient policy arena. In a principal-agent relationship such a physician-patient, the ideal situation
is when the agent makes the same decisions an informed principal would make, given the same
information. Scott and Vick (1999) noted that in the physician-patient policy arena, there is an
absence of an explicit contract between principal and agent. The lack of an explicit contract puts
the principal (patient) at a disadvantage when services are received because the experience is
based on agent (physician) actions rather that predictable expectations known by both parties
(Landwehr and Bohm, 2011; Scott and Vick, 1999).
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The study by Scott and Vick (1999) found a relationship between the annual number of
times a patient engages with a physician in care delivery and their involvement in decisionmaking about care delivery based on the information presented by the physician. The greater the
number of times the patient and physician interact, the more relevant information becomes and
the greater the likelihood that the patient will become involved in decision-making (Scott and
Vick, 1999, p. 127). Patient engagement in treatment decisions has been shown to improve
quality outcomes (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2014).
The Scott and Vick findings (1999, p. 113-114; 127) suggest that patients with less
frequent interactions simply want to know “what is going on” rather than being engaged in care
through the details of treatment or options – indicating a preference for information in the short
term over knowledge and understanding. They also found that in cases where the care being
provided is due to an acute episode of care, such as severe pain, patients are not inclined to seek
much information at all about their care. Patients are inclined to simply accept the physician’s
recommendations, including purchase, reimbursement, and patient out-of-pocket payment
decisions (Scott and Vick, 1999, p. 128). The significance of the Scott and Vick (1999) research
findings to the ACA is that under health reform the volume of physician-patient interactions are
limited through cost containment measures and may possibly create a gap between the services a
physician is willing to provide and actually engaging patients in their own care.
Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt (2009, p. 153) investigated a “gap between research
and practice” related to health policy and physician behavior in care delivery. This gap is
observed quite dramatically when physician decisions about standards of care are over-ruled by
payers’ based on practice guidelines where cost and not the patient is the focus of care delivery.
For example during reimbursement adjudication payers will often “audit” practice transactions
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that appear, at least on paper, to be outside of allowed services. An example of this gap is the
case where a physician prescribes daily monitoring of blood glucose levels and the payer
specifies weekly monitoring as being adequate (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2013). Often, the physician disputes the adjudication decision without reimbursement for the
time spent regardless of outcome. In the end such practice guidelines are frequently not used or
recognized as valid by physicians in their decision-making process and the patient becomes the
payer of those services (Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt, 2009). Physicians sometimes
establish “barriers to dissemination” with their patients by ignoring regulations they perceive to
be narrowly focused or improperly validated by research and that do not mirror their individual
practice style (Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt, 2009, p. 153).
Barriers to dissemination may also influence physician opinions about broad policy
issues. The result may produce motivation for to take advantage of the situation and promote
their own perspective to patients (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Stone, 1999). Such
self-promotion that influences physician opinions about health policy may further bias the
presentation of information to patients about treatment options in the policy arena (National
Institutes of Health, 2014). Green, Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt (2009, p. 154) blame “traditionbound practitioners who insist on practicing their way …” for attempting to maintain the care
delivery status quo. In their study conclusion, Green Ottoson, Garcia, and Hiatt (2009, p.166)
state that “scientific” evidence resulting in health policy is meant to be “practice-based” from the
patients’ perspective, reflecting the reality of individual patient and population needs rather than
the self-interest of healthcare providers. In this sense “practice-based” is interpreted to be
evidence-based medicine that integrates collective choice rules with physicians’ clinical
expertise (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, Richardson, 1996). Without such an objective
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basis for decision-making at the point of care, it is likely that the self-interests of stakeholders
will continue to be a hindrance in meeting reform policy goals.
Influences on physician opinions about changing the status quo are challenges to
overcome in the traditional care delivery system. Closing the gap between the reality of day-today care delivery and the effectiveness of reform intended to mediate physician self-interest may
not simply be a matter of new rule-making. The influences on physicians’ opinions about reform
are broad-based and intertwined with an array of physician self-interests. A starting point for
health reform adoption may be to positively shift physicians’ self-interest in support of reform.
Physician Support of the Affordable Care Act
The ACA was the first significant health reform legislation to challenge the care delivery
status quo since the passage of Medicare legislation in 1965. The ACA changes the status quo of
care delivery and physician behavior away from acute care toward preventative care. It includes
endorsements for non-physician primary care delivery. The ACA mandates a greater role for IA
APRNs as part of collaborative care models using capitation 2 as the associated financial model in
lieu of fee-for-service reimbursement (Angood and Birk, 2014; Connors and Gostin, 2010;
Lathrop and Hodnicki, 2014). Reform of the primary care delivery model and access to primary
care services through the chronic care management model is also legislated under the ACA. Four
of the key goals of ACA care delivery reform are: 1) to increase the utilization of basic primary
care services, 2) to include mechanisms for preventative services, 3) to deliver long-term chronic
care management through primary care, previously in the purview of specialist physicians, and
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Capitation is a form of pre-payment for services. Fixed payments are provided that encourage
pro-active care in order to avoid the costs associated with acute care delivery. Physicians and/or
their practices may also receive periodic bonus payments for sustaining low overall cost
outlays.
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4) to provide cost controls in the traditional care delivery status quo (Lathrop and Hodnicki,
2014). These and other objectives from the ACA are dependent on an adequate supply of PCPs,
or their equivalent, in the care delivery system (Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013).
Collaborative care and/or so-called “patient-centric” care delivery models are integral
cost-saving components of health system reform under the ACA. There are two newly
sanctioned delivery models, Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) and Patient Centered
Medical Homes (PCMH), which specify care delivery with and without physicians as sole
decision-makers (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012). Both of these new ACA delivery models
rely on APRNs and other non-physicians to deliver and coordinate primary care services directly
to patients (Angood and Birk, 2014; Auerbach, Chen, Friedberg, Reid, Lau, Buerhaus, and
Mehrotra, 2013; Nielsen, Olayiwola, Grundy, and Grumbach, 2014). The transformation of the
healthcare delivery system under reform requires the participation of physicians to provide
professional and policy leadership and drive the operational change necessary to reform the
traditional care delivery models (Angood and Birk, 2014; Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2012;
Zismer, 2013).
Studies that assess physician support of the ACA are most often presented in terms of
physician clinical behaviors during the day-to-day practice of medicine (Berwick, Nolan, and
Whittington, 2008, p. 759; Friedberg, et al., 2015). Point-of-care behaviors are responses by
physicians to implementations of the ACA in their license jurisdictions. Frequently how
physicians deliver care is heavily influenced by their self-interest in preserving the status quo
rather than conforming to provisions of reform legislation (Friedberg, Chen, Van Bususm,
Aunon, Pham, Caloyeras, Mattke, Pitchforth, Quigley, Brook, Crosson, and Tutty, 2013;
Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim, 2012). Health policy to improve the US healthcare system
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requires that the delivery system focus on “… improving the experience of care, improving the
health of populations, and reducing the per capita costs of health care” (Berwick, Nolan, and
Whittington, 2008, p. 759; Friedberg, et al., 2015). Policymakers generally intend to motivate
healthcare providers through financial incentives and disincentives that meet the “rational
common needs” of US society and includes the goal of improving the quality of the life of all
Americans (Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington, 2008, p. 761). Physicians may see the changes
under the ACA as challenges to their legal medical authority rather than a means to control costs
and spending on care.
Fundamentally, if health policy is able to effectively regulate spending controls at the
point-of-purchase and improve the patient-provider interaction, then, equitable social benefits
between the costs paid by government, the self-interest from reimbursement received by
providers, and the best interests of patients can be optimally accomplished (Enthoven and Singer,
1999). Health policy, such as the ACA, that impacts the distribution of money through delivery
system reform risks an increase in provider self-interest over public interest. This risk is
especially salient if the policy challenges the opinions of physicians about what is proper care
and for whom it should be provided (Enthoven and Singer, 1999; Hill, Wilkinson, and Holahan,
2014; Mintrom, 1997).
Friedberg et al. (2013, p. xvi-xvii) found that physicians viewed the imposition of rules
through national legislation to be “… obstacles to providing high quality care” and not in their
individual or collective interests. As a result, they would probably not abide by the rules in
practice. As the legislative constraints increase the impact on physician clinical practice patterns,
they are likely exit private practice and move their practices into different business models
(Friedberg et al., 2013; Physicians Foundation, 2012). A newer study by Friedberg et al. (2015)
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confirmed that changes in clinical practice patterns were related to physicians’ opinions about
the ACA and are projected to continue to impact clinical practices through the near future.
As implementation of the ACA continues through the decade, these type actions by
physicians that change their relationships with patients may be further exacerbated through an
increasing focus on cost containment from private payers. Private payers, while not impacted by
the ACA the same as public payers, are following the lead of government in regulating
reimbursable procedures over the objections of physicians’ clinical expertise (Physicians
Foundation, 2012). Friedberg et al.’s study (2013, p. xviii) also noted that as physicians exit
private practice and become employees in care delivery systems such as ACOs and hospital
systems, there is “… increased pressure to provide greater quantities of services” from those
organization. The system demand for more services is about using system provided services to
the degree they are horizontally integrated throughout the patient care continuum. The
significance of this emerging trend may be an over-utilization of lower cost non-reimbursable
services on a more frequent basis as a mechanism of cost recovery through direct payments from
patients. This cost-shifting to patients and away from payers occurs in the form of higher
insurance deductibles, co-insurance, and co-pays (Patel and Rushefsky, 2014). Thus, while cost
containment goals may reduce federal spending on healthcare, the actual cost will remain the
same or rise higher as reform policy shifts physicians from one care delivery system to another.
The role of care delivery systems, for instance ACOs, is increasingly influential upon
physician opinions as they transition from business owners in private practice to employees
(Merritt Hawkins, 2014). While typically self-interest is a personal characteristic, self-interest
from a central organizational perspective can also be reinforced through collective membership
and polycentric governance relationships enabled through employment (Ostrom, 2005). In this
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case, the self-interest of the physician, keeping a satisfactory employment relationship for
instance, is removed from the forefront of care delivery decisions, but is still a driving force in
decision-making as collective choice is exercised (Ostrom, 1990). Integrating physician selfinterest into palatable community/public interest is key to gaining policy support by physician
stakeholders who are still the primary appropriators of the community’s healthcare resources
under the ACA (Friedberg, et al., 2013; Ostrom, 1990).
Physicians through their non-clinical roles shape policy in their participation, or lack
thereof, in the political system by assisting and supporting legislators in setting the healthcare
agenda in their state jurisdictions (Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman, 2014). It is unlikely that
meaningful health system reform can occur by either passing legislation or public advocacy
alone without physician support, given the relationship of state-licensed physicians to spending,
quality, and cost of healthcare (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). Kumar, Sherwood, and
Sutaria (2013) looked at the engagement of physicians’ behavior about expected changes in the
healthcare system under the ACA. Their study surveyed 1,400 physicians in an investigation of
the alignment of day-to-day operations in physicians’ practice environments with the physician’s
attitudes toward making changes in their traditional care delivery system (Kumar, Sherwood, and
Sutaria, 2013, p. 5). The study’s conclusion suggests that physician motivation under at least
some of the ACA provisions was less about improving the care delivery system or patient health
status and more about increasing revenue. Physicians, the investigators concluded, seem more
concerned with compensation, followed by their desire to practice autonomously as part of the
status quo (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013, p. 5). The findings by Kumar, Sherwood, and
Sutaria should not be surprising to policy-makers. Providing healthcare services, especially at the
primary care provider level, is, by and large, a commodity business, meaning, “… there is little
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difference in the quality of service between providers …” especially as policy continues to focus
on costs rather than patient experience (Burney, 2012, p. 2).
Since the passage of the ACA and through its mandate to insure the masses and increase
primary care services while cutting reimbursement, the relationship between independent
primary care physicians and the care delivery system has not been completely beneficial to
physicians’ independent autonomous status (Jackson Healthcare, 2013). In 2000, about 57% of
physician practices were independently owned rather than practicing physicians being engaged
in an employment relationship (Accenture, 2012, p. 2; Elliott, 2012, p. 2). In 2012, the
independent ownership of physician practices declined to 39% and is expected to fall further
through 2020 as a consequence of health policy under current ACA legislation (Physicians
Foundation, 2010; Accenture, 2012, p. 2; Elliott, 2012, p. 2, Jackson Healthcare, 2013, p.6).
The shift in the management and ownership of physician practices as influenced by the
ACA may signal an environment where APRNs are accepted as equivalent practitioners to their
PCP counterparts (Kirchoff, 2013; FTC, 2014). According to Jackson Healthcare (2013, p. 6)
39% of physicians under the age of 45 have never worked in private practice, with 32% of that
group choosing an employment relationship to avoid direct involvement in the management of a
medical practice. Younger PCPs may be inclined to be more supportive of IA APRNs due to
their choices of employment over practice business ownership. Jackson & Coker (2013, p. 1015) and also Zismer, (2011) found that physicians’ attitudes were overwhelmingly negative
about the impact of the ACA on their compensation (71%), their workload (61%), their ability to
continue to make independent treatment decisions (57%), their practice’s revenue per patient
(69%), and the amount of professional time lost to administrative requirements under the ACA
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(66%). These data and employment preference by younger physicians seem to suggest that
physician attrition out of private practice may be important to successful adoption of the ACA.
Antiel, Curlin, James, and Tilburt (2009) and Antiel, James, Egginton, Sheeler, Liebow,
Goold, and Tilburt (2014) found that physician doubts about the benefits to them from health
reform is not a motivation to become active in national policy-making arenas. Physicians in
general do agree that their professional responsibility includes influencing how care is delivered
in their local practice areas. Interested physicians assist in writing state and local legislation,
champion state health policy legislation, and support performance changes in the physicianpatient policy arena all the while making care delivery purchase decisions enabled or sanctioned
by that same health policy (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012; Jones, 2013; Kumar,
Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). The lack of involvement in national health policy development
means that physician involvement in state policy efforts is after the fact of mandated reform. As
such, the physician collective may not support health reform simply by not engaging in its
adoption in their local practice jurisdictions.
Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria (2013, p. 3) found in a survey of 1400 practicing
physicians that 84% were willing to make changes in the way they practice medicine. However,
when asked specifically what ACA changes they had implemented only 17% of their
respondents indicated they had actually made changes in their practice (Kumar, Sherwood, and
Sutaria, 2013, p. 4). These “disconnects” between what is said and actually done in support of
the ACA seem to suggest that the physician collective is not being adequately engaged to follow
through to make the changes necessary for reform (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). In
2014, only 11 out of 50 states had implemented Medicaid expansion which is a keystone
provision of the ACA intended to increase access to care for previously uninsured citizens (Keith
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and Lucia, 2014, p. 7). One problem for physicians with the Medicaid expansion is that Medicaid
reimbursement is typically the lowest rate of reimbursement in their practice (Decker, 2012). In a
study of 1460 PCPs, more than one-third of physician practices indicated they would not provide
services to patients under Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011, p. 7). With
inadequate physician participation in the Medicaid expansion which is projected to provide
subsidized insurance to 32 million new patients, the traditional care delivery system will be
virtually unchanged under reform provisions of the ACA (Decker, 2012; Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2011, p. 1).
Physician opinions about supporting health reform seem to favor no change to the status
quo based on the actions many physicians have taken so far (Jackson Coker, 2013; Keith and
Lucia, 2014). Physicians indicate the care delivery system needs to be modified, but there is
evidence to suggest they are not willing to make changes under the ACA (Kumar, Sherwood,
and Sutaria, 2013). Not engaging in national policy initiatives and not supporting state adoption
of many parts of the ACA appears to be a statement from physicians about their entitlement in
the business of healthcare. Whether physicians support the ACA and the lack of successful
implementation of key parts of the act seems to suggest that reform of the care delivery system is
dependent on physician engagement (Keith and Lucia, 2014). Engagement in policy processes
may be a matter of reconciling physician attitudes about the ACA with their beliefs about how
the care delivery system should be changed. Physician attitudes seem to be oriented toward
interests associated with clinical factors rather than the cost containment interests of payers.
Understanding the core beliefs of the physician collective that reinforce their opinions about
reform may be important for successful adoption of IA APRN health policy in their states’
jurisdiction (Sabatier, 1988).
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Ideology as a Mechanism of Influence on Physician Opinions
Ideology is a system of shared attitudes and opinions based on beliefs that are context
specific and generally symbolic in attribution (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Shanahan, Jones,
McBeth, and Lane, 2013). Ideology is best understood as a symbolic representation of individual
beliefs and opinions about a position or an issue. A person’s ideology guides how they behave in
context of an issue or position. Ideology also serves as a mechanism for individuals to selfidentify with a group of like-minded individuals who take sides on an issue in opposition to
others (Cobb and Elder, 1973; Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013). Conover and
Feldman (1981) suggested that the public, presumably most individuals included, does not have
an understanding of the meanings of ideological labels such as liberal and conservative, but still
makes fairly consistent choices about which side of an issue to join. Accordingly, the ideology
labels of conservative and liberal are the basis of political discourse of all types and serve to
alienate or disenfranchise people who do not or cannot share similar attitudes and opinions
(Federico, 2009). It is the similarity of individuals’ beliefs and/or opinions that may influence an
individual to support or oppose an issue based simply on group affiliation (Bandura, 2000;
Federico, 2009; Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013).
Ideology serves to assist individuals in evaluating their position about an issue by
blending together multiple points of view on a range of topics into a common perspective rather
than being strictly evaluative about the single topic or issue (Conover and Feldman, 1981;
Federico, 2009). Ideology is often represented as a polar scale with conservative at one end and
liberal at the other end. Ideology is a symbolic representation that is tied to the groups an
individual identifies with through membership or affiliation and becomes part of an individual’s
belief system (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009). For instance, liberals as a group tend to believe
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that government should solve problems, such as healthcare costs, while conservatives tend to
believe that individual empowerment is the means of problem-solving and social stability
(Conover and Feldman, 1981; Jost, 2006). Ideologies both bring people and interests together
and at times drives them apart with vehemence. Throughout history ideologies have been vilified
as cultural phenomena that pit one set of peoples against another such as polarizing Marxist
socialism in comparison to capitalism (Jost, 2006).
Jost (2006, p. 654) characterizes ideology as a contrast of attitudes about “… social
change versus tradition” which is simply the conflict between innovation and the status quo. Jost
(2006) establishes that ideology provides meaning to the behaviors people engage and gives
others a way to gravitate toward like-mindedness. Jost (2006) also states that while ideology
seemingly is related to self-interest(s), it is also the case that ideology is related to group
identification rather than being simply an internalized behavioral construct. As individuals
become part of a collective there is a tendency to “engage in system justification” even when
such behaviors are counter-productive with rational social change (Jost, 2006, p. 655).
Conservatives tend to exhibit behaviors that are related to self-interest while liberals tend
to exhibit behaviors toward the common good which is also a “classic” distinction between
support for hierarchy and individual equality (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009, p. 310).
Individual behaviors are not mutually exclusive to a particular ideology, but are displayed as a
tendency to “be” ideologically conservative or liberal in terms of an individual’s beliefs through
symbolic meaning (Cobb and Elder, 1973). Sabatier (1988, p. 145; Heintz and Jenkins-Smith,
1988, p. 266) refers to ideology as being a part of the set of “deep (normative) core beliefs” that
are firmly entrenched and difficult to change and which establishes the sides of issues related to
differences in opinions about policy. The core beliefs represent the strength of association for a
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policy topic/issue by agents in a policy arena (Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2011).
The liberal perspective tends to be associated with willingness to accept or stimulate political
change, while the conservative perspective tends toward the status quo and the need to maintain
order and familiar social structure (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009).
Since the passage of the ACA, the U.S. Congress and the public alike are nearly evenly
divided along ideological and political party lines about the benefits, value, and usefulness of the
ACA which favors strong federal control over healthcare delivery (Doherty and Tyson, 2014). In
fact, when the ACA was passed there was not a single Republican vote for passage of the Act,
even though the legislation was modeled after a Republican-authored health reform in
Massachusetts (Gruber, 2011a; Joyce, 2010). Republicans tend toward a conservative ideology
while Democrats exhibit a liberal ideology. The implications of such party line voting are that
reactions to policy such as the ACA may be more about group–based ideological identification
rather than the substance of the policy per se (Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman, 2014). Zschirnt
(2011) in fact suggests that it is not the specific policy that elicits negative support from the
public and professionals, but rather the fact that the policy was promoted by a single political
group/party with a divergent ideology to those who oppose or support it.
Zschirnt (2011, p. 692) evaluated ideological self-identity and views on politically
charged issues through analysis of the 2004 National Election Study. Zschirnt confirms previous
studies that suggest that “feelings” toward an issue is really about which group(s), labor,
business, religion, or APRNs, symbolize support for or opposition to a policy rather than the
meaningfulness of the policy (Zschirnt, 2011). Tesler (2012) studied group influences
surrounding the ACA by looking at cross-sectional data from the American National Election
Study (ANES) and the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP). Tesler’s (2012, p. 693)
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mixed method approach that included interview observations of 3,147 CCAP participants in
addition to the ANES data suggested that there was a grouping of individual opinions about the
ACA around racial affiliation. One conclusion based on the Tesler study “… whether using
ANES or CCAP panel data …” is that “… racial attitudes became more important in white
Americans’ beliefs about health care …” rather other related groups or legislation alone (Tesler,
2012, p. 696). Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin (2013) looking at different data sets similarly found
that white Americans as a group were less supportive of the ACA than were blacks or other
groups of Americans. These findings in terms of support for the ACA are possibly more
associated with in/out group affiliation as a result of racial membership rather than racial bias per
se (Jost, 2006; Tesler, 2015).
According to the Association of American Medical Colleges (2010, p. 17), 75% of
physicians practicing medicine in the US are white, well educated, and affluent. If indeed the
racial spillover effects from policy advocacy for the ACA as described by Tesler and Lewis,
Dowe, and Franklin are consistent throughout the US population (Tesler, 2012; Lewis, Dowe,
and Franklin, 2013), physicians as an group may have de facto difficulty supporting the ACA or
any meaningful efforts to change the traditional care system simply because of the supporting
groups associated with the health policy rather than the meaningfulness, benefits, or incentives to
be derived from the policy (Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg, 2010; Zschirnt, 2011). The PCP
collective as an exclusive group of individuals through the nature of its limited membership may
perceive non-members who advocate change to the collective’s exclusive membership rules as a
challenge to the beliefs and opinions of individual members (Cobb and Elder, 1973). In the face
of evidence to the contrary individual group members may espouse the messages of the group
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and deny the legitimacy of the desired change simply based on individuals or groups who
support the change (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Stone, 1989).
A Pew Research study in 2014 found that there are cohesive groups that form out of
influences from ideology. Group opinions and attitudes are likely to be shared among group
members irrespective of individual member opinions and attitudes (Dimock, Doherty, Kiley, and
Krishnamurthy, 2014, p.2). Business conservatives, as one such group, tend to have beliefs and
attitudes that are steadfast conservative in political value orientation, tend to prefer free markets,
and overwhelmingly oppose the Obama administration and its policies (Dimock et al, 2014, p.
6). Business conservatives, about 27% of registered voters, tend to be overwhelmingly white and
male, well educated, affluent, and tend to be politically active. As a group they are similar in
makeup to that of the US physician community (American Association of Medical Colleges,
2010, p. 17; American Association of Medical Colleges, 2013; Dimock et al, 2014, p. 6).
Business conservatives who are also physicians predictably would tend to support the models of
care delivery that reward increases in services utilization through the status quo fee-for-service
care delivery system rather than expanding the delivery system with IA APRNs (Berwick and
Hackbarth, 2012).
Through the status quo/traditional care delivery system, physicians unilaterally determine
how many patients to add or maintain in their practice in response to legislation and regulation
such as the ACA (Jacobson, Earle, and Newhouse, 2011). The ability of physicians to claim
reimbursement in a self-beneficial manner shapes the business of healthcare and related
treatment decisions as well as influencing patient decisions about access to care services and
their treatment (Berwick, 2013). It is plausible, therefore, that ideologically conflicting
legislation that attempts to modify or eliminate the traditional the status quo would be perceived
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as a negative value to individual physicians in some instances. The negative valuation by
physicians would likely result in a bias toward reform and possibly extend their bias to positive
features of reform legislation even in the face of evidence to the contrary.
Summary of the Chapter
This chapter outlined a review of scholarly literature that is representative of the state of
knowledge about the possible influences on physicians’ opinions about IA APRNs. The scope of
potential influences was narrowed for study through a critical review of relevant literature to
identify the most likely associations with physician opinions. The value proposition of APRNs in
primary care was presented as a confirmation of why IA APRNs are a reasonable solution for
reform of the care delivery system. From that basis the purpose for the research question of why
do some PCPs support IA APRNs while others do not was established. Assessing the research
question fills a gap in the literature about why there is not broad acceptance of IA APRNs by
PCPs. Collective choice theory was rationalized as the study’s theoretical orientation in the
context of care delivery. It was observed that challenges to the status quo may cause physician
opinions to be biased against a broad range of mandated reform including support for IA APRNs.
Through the review of literature several potential influences on physician opinions were
identified and are included as independent variables in the study. Physician gender and race are
observed to be possible differentiators for their opinions about APRNs. The restrictions from
state scope-of-practice laws was found to suggest a possible alignment with physician opinions
about APRNs. Some states that permit IA APRN practice demonstrated positive cost and access
outcomes and general support by physicians in those jurisdictions (Conover and Richards, 2015;
Oliver, Pennington, and Reville, 2015).
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Based on the review of literature, several personal factors of physicians may be
influences on their opinions about APRNs. The two key concepts of this study: 1) ideology and,
2) support of the ACA are seen as likely potential influences on physicians’ opinions (Jost, 2006;
Keith and Lucia, 2014). Physicians’ length of time in practice is a possible influence on their
opinions about APRNs (Jackson Coker, 2013). The relative age of physicians’ practicing primary
care is seen as a potential association with physicians’ opinions about APRNs. Changes in
physicians’ support of the ACA over time was identified as a possible factor in physicians’
support of APRNs in the literature review (Jackson Coker, 2013). The physician’s non-clinical
role in their medical practice is recognized as a possible influence on their opinions about
APRNs in several prior studies (Zismer, 2013). The working relationship physicians have with
APRNs is also a likely influence on physicians’ opinions (Street and Cossman, 2010).
In the literature review, particular attention was paid to the physician-patient policy arena
in order to understand the role of non-physician stakeholders on physician opinions about
APRNs. Several influences in the physician-patient policy arena were reviewed as foundation for
the study’s independent variables ideology and support for the ACA. The ACA’s
recommendation of IA APRNs as peers to physicians in primary care was established as a
representative component of the ACA. As such, physicians’ opinions about APRNs in clinical
practice is identified as the study’s dependent variable. The relative level of physician ideology
and support for the ACA are promising as indicators of physician support of APRNs.

60
Chapter Three - Research Design
Introduction
This chapter describes the study’s research question, hypotheses about the research
question, and methods of analysis, measurement, survey instrument, data collection, and
variables of interest in the study. The study poses ten (10) hypotheses that may lead to insights
about the research question. The dependent variable in the study is PCP opinions about APRNs.
The study investigates the direction of ideology and support for the ACA as independent
variables on PCPs’ opinions about IA APRNs. Characteristics of the respondents are included as
independent variables describing demographics and their clinical practice. The demographic
variables are: age, gender and race. Variables related to physicians’ clinical practice are: length
of time in practice, state of practice/licensure, non-clinical role in the medical practice, and
whether the respondent works with APRNs. PCPs in the regionally adjoining states of Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma are the population of PCPs from which the
study sample was drawn. All of these states currently restrict APRN practice.
Institutional Review Board Approval
An online survey, described later, is used to gather data about the study variables. The
survey instrument and solicitation messages were submitted to and approved by the University of
Arkansas Institutional Review Board (IRB). A copy of the IRB approval letter to conduct the
study is included in Appendix A. The text of the initial and follow-up solicitation emails is
included in Appendix B. The complete survey instrument is included in Appendix C.
Research Question
The study’s research question is: Why do some primary care physicians support independent
autonomous practice for advanced practice registered nurses while others do not?
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Hypotheses
The hypotheses about the research question are presented in Table 3.1. The table outlines
each of the study’s hypotheses and identifies the independent variables to be tested. The groups
to be compared through analysis are also identified in Table 3.1. Additional details describing the
independent variables appear in succeeding sections of this chapter.
Table 3. 1 Hypotheses, Independent Variables, and Comparison Groups
Hypothesis

Independent
Variable

Comparison Groups

1. PCPs who are more ideologically conservative are less
supportive of IA APRNs than PCPs who are more ideologically
liberal.

Ideology
Composite
∑ Q36-Q41

(Min 6-Max 30)
Conservative < 16
Liberal > 20

2. PCPs who support the ACA are more supportive of IA
APRNs than PCPs who do not support the ACA.

ACA
Composite
∑ Q20-Q29

(Min 10-Max 50)
Support < 29
Oppose > 31

3. PCPs who have been practicing longer than 20 years are less
likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs who have been
practicing less than 20 years.

Q34 Time in
Practice

> 20 years
≤ 20 years

4. PCPs who practice medicine as employees are more likely to
support IA APRNs than PCPs who do not.

Q44 Role in
Practice

Employees
Non-employees

5. PCPs who are younger than 60 years of age are more likely
to support IA APRNs than those PCPs who are older.

Q30 Age

< 60 years of age
≥ 60 years of age

6. PCPs in AR with less restrictive scope-of-practice laws are
more likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs in OK with more
restrictive scope-of-practice laws.

Q43 State of
Licensure

Arkansas (least)
Oklahoma (most)

7. PCPs who work with APRNs are more likely to support IA
APRNs than PCPs who do not work with APRNs

Q46 Work
with APRN

Work with APRN
No work with APRN

Q3 ACA
Opinion
Change

More Supportive
Less Supportive

Q31 Gender

Male
Female

Q32 Race

Non-Caucasian
Caucasian

8. PCPs whose opinions have changed to be more supportive of
the ACA are more likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs
whose opinions have changed to be less supportive of the ACA.
9. Female PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs than
male PCPs.
10. Non-Caucasian PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs
than Caucasian PCPs
Note: See Appendix C for question wording.
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Variables and Measures
Table 3.2 is a summary describing the survey’s question set characteristics. In the
sections following Table 3.2 are detailed explanations of the questions associated with each
variable in the study, the response categories of each variable type, and relevant variable scoring.
Table 3. 2 Summary of Question Set Construction
Question Set

Question List

Question Type

Range of Response

PCP Opinion about APRNs
(Dependent Variable)

Q5-Q16

Dependent Variable
(Continuous)

Min. 12 Max 60
Composite Score

Support for ACA

Q20-Q29

Independent Variable
(Continuous)

Min 10 Max 50
Composite Score

Ideology

Q36-Q41

Independent Variable
(Continuous)

Min 6 Max 30
Composite Score

Respondent Characteristics

Q3, Q30-Q34
Q43, Q44, Q46

Independent Variable
(Primarily Ordinal;
Nominal as
appropriate)

Yes/No
Select a Group
Likert Item

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, PCP Opinions about IA APRNs, is derived from a set of twelve
(12) statements about APRNs working in the primary care practice setting. Each statement is
intended to elicit a respondent’s level of agreement or disagreement. The statements were
originally developed by Acquilino et al (1999) and were also used by Street and Cossman
(2010). Respondents are asked to choose their response to each statement from five Likert items
scaled as strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The
items are scored on a five point scale from 1 to 5. A score of 1 is most supportive of APRNs and
5 is least supportive of APRNs. Three (3) is a neutral score. A composite Likert score is
calculated by summing the response score for each of the 12 statements. The larger the
composite score, the less supportive the response is toward APRNs. The minimum score, most
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supportive of APRNs, is 12. The maximum score, least supportive of APRNs, is 60. The
composite response score suggests the strength and direction of the respondent’s opinion about
APRNs. A “no response” or missing value to any statement in the 12 item set excludes that
respondent/case from any analysis involving the dependent variable. No composite score is
computed for a case with a missing value on any statement relating to the dependent variable.
The dependent variable statements in the current study’s instrument are numbered continuously
from Q5 to Q16.
Primary Independent Variables – Support for the ACA and Ideology
One of the two primary independent variables in the study is support for the Affordable
Care Act (ACA). The ACA independent variable is a Likert composite score derived from ten
(10) statements for each respondent. Statements Q20 through Q29 in the study instrument are
intended to measure the direction and support for the ACA. The set of statements was assembled
from statements developed by Huntoon, McCluney, Scannell, et al (2011) and Jackson Health
Care (2012). Respondents are asked to choose their response about each statement from five
Likert items scaled as strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly
agree. The Likert items were scored from 1 to 5 with 3 being a neutral response. The composite
Likert score ranges from 10, least supportive, to 50 more supportive of the ACA. A “no
response” or missing value to any question in the set excludes that respondent’s case from any
analysis involving this independent variable and no composite score for that case is produced.
Three groups are created based on the distribution of respondents’ Likert scores for this
variable. The groups, support the ACA, neutral on the ACA, and do not support the ACA, are
created using approximately equal class intervals from the range of response scores. Support for
the ACA and do not support the ACA were included in the analysis. The “neutral on the ACA”
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group was created to account for the likelihood that not all respondents are likely to either
support or not support the ACA. The interval cut-points from the composite score are calculated
from actual responses. 3
The second primary independent variable of interest is a measure suggesting the
respondent’s ideological leaning. Ideology is represented on a polar scale of conservative to
liberal. There are six (6) statements in the study instrument that are summed to produce an
ideology Likert/composite score for each respondent. Statements Q36 to Q41 are statements
measuring the ideological leaning of the respondent. The item set for ideology was derived from
a Pew Research (2014) study. Respondents are asked to choose their response about the
statement from five Likert items scaled as strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree,
agree, and strongly agree. The Likert items were scored from 1, conservative, to 5, liberal. The
composite score ranges from 6 to 30 with smaller relative scores representing conservativism and
larger scores representing a liberalism. A “no response” to any question in the set excluded that
respondent from any analysis involving this independent variable and no composite score for that
case was produced.
Three groups are created based on the range of the composite score in the respondent
population. The groups, conservative, moderate, and liberal are derived from approximately
equal class intervals of respondents. The respondent groups conservative and liberal are included
in the analysis. The “moderate” group is created to accommodate the likelihood that not all

3

For this study the cut-points derived post-analysis are: support the ACA < 29, neutral ≥ 29 ≤ 31,
and do not support the ACA > 31. Details for the computation of the cut-points are explained
below in Chapter 4, Univariate Data Analysis.
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respondents are likely to be either conservative or liberal. The interval cut-points from the
composite score are calculated from actual responses. 4
Respondent Characteristics Variables
There are eight independent variables that represent characteristics of individual
respondents. The independent variables describing respondents include three demographic
characteristics and five practice characteristics. The items use a variety of question formats
including: yes or no responses, choose a category, or Likert items. Demographic variables
include: age (Q30), gender (Q31), and race (Q32). The items describing the respondent’s practice
include: support of the ACA over time (Q3), years in practice (Q34), state of licensure (Q43),
practice organization role (Q44), and the respondent’s work relationship with APRNs (Q46).
The response categories for age, race, years in practice, and practice organization role
were collapsed from five categories into two categories for analysis. The resulting categories
relate to the study hypotheses and are determined as relevant for the study from the literature
review.
Method of Data Analysis
The study uses a between-subject design. The study is designed to answer the research
question by testing group differences in the study respondents. Responses to survey items
occurred in two or more independent groups. A univariate analysis of the dependent variable and
each of the independent variables is completed to describe the response characteristics of the
associated variable. Bivariate testing is completed for each of ten (10) hypothesis. The bivariate

4

For this study the cut-points derived post-analysis are: conservative < 16, moderate ≥ 16 ≤ 20,
and liberal > 20. Details for the computation of the cut-points are explained below in Chapter 4,
Univariate Data Analysis.
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method used to test hypotheses about the research question’s group differences is the t test for
independent sample means. The p-value is set at p ≤ 05.
Survey Instrument
A survey instrument was designed to capture responses related to the dependent and
independent variables in four (4) groupings or sections of question, see Table 3.2. The survey
instrument was constructed for delivery over the internet. The survey was designed with a target
completion time of under the (10) minutes with the average expected time to compete the survey
of seven (7) minutes. The survey questions are organized for presentation in the instrument so
that individual questions relating to a particular question grouping appear continuously in the
instrument. The eight questions relating to respondent characteristics are split into sub-groups in
no particular order. The sub-groups of respondent characteristics questions are interspersed
between the other question sets as a convenience in the design of the survey instrument. There is
no intended relationship in the order of presentation for the question groupings except that
questions sets other than respondent characteristics questions appeared together in their relevant
question group. The design of the survey instrument and techniques for administering the web
survey are based on “The Tailored Design Method” of Dillman, Smythe, and Christian (2014).
Study Population
The study sampled physicians from a population of PCPs practicing adult primary care in
five regionally adjoining states: Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.
States were selected to assure as much as possible that market and PCP practice influences were
similar in terms of access and services demand for primary care services. Tables 3.3 and 3.4
summarize the state population characteristics.
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Table 3. 3 PCP Population Characteristics - Part 1
State

PCP
Sample
N

PCP per
100,000
Population

Medicaid Enrollment
Percent of Population

Medicare Enrollment
Percent of Population

Per Capita
Healthcare
Spending

Alabama
(AL)

602

77.5

18.1%

18.3%

$6272

Arkansas
(AR)

483

79.7

28.0%

18.7%

$6167

Louisiana
(LA)

724

81.6

22.9%

15.6%

$6795

Mississippi
(MS)

469

71.0

23.9%

17.3%

$6571

Oklahoma
(OK)

861

82.8

21.2%

16.4%

$6532

Note: Study states’ PCPs per 100,000 population in primarily adult practice, average 78.5 range 77.582.8 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014. Percentage of Medicaid enrollment in the population,
average 22.8% range 18.1-27.9 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). Percentage of Medicare
enrollment in the population, average 17.3% range 16.4-18.7 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012).
Per capita combined public and private healthcare spending, average $6467 range $6167-$6785
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009).

First, the state selection considered states’ regional proximity to one another. Regional
proximity was a consideration because of the likelihood of similarity between states’ health
policy including APRN scope-of-practice laws (Berry and Berry, 2007). Secondly, states were
selected if their APRN scope-of-practice regulations were restrictive. Restricted APRN scope-ofpractice was used to assure that the resulting PCP sample is similar in their clinical relationships
with APRNs. Other selection factors included: PCPs per 100,000 population, Medicaid and
Medicare population as a percent of the total state population, per capita healthcare spending,
and health ranking. Finally, the similarity between all study states’ political ideology was
considered. AL, AR, LA, and MS are part of the conservative “Solid South” political voting bloc
(Buchanan and Kapeluck, 2014). OK is typically not considered to be a part of that descriptive
voting bloc when characterizing population based politics. However, OK is very similar in
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conservative voting behavior to the other states selected for the respondent population (Buchanan
and Kapeluck, 2014; Savage, Min, Beasley, Pilcher, 2013).
Table 3. 4 PCP Population Characteristics - Part 2

State

State Political Structure
(Governor/House/Senate)

APRN
Scope-of-Practice
Restriction Tasks
(1= most - 7=least)

National Health
Status Rank
(Out of 50 states
with 1 = best)

Alabama

Repub/Repub/Repub

1

47

Arkansas

Repub/Repub/Repub

6

49

Louisiana

Repub/Repub/Repub

4

48

Mississippi

Repub/Repub/Repub

4

50

Oklahoma

Repub/Repub/Repub

2

44

Note: National health status rankings are compiled by America’s Health Ranking, 2013. APRN scopeof-practice restriction rating compiled by Barton Associates (2015) based on seven typical scopeof-practice criteria ranking from most restrictive (0 out of 7) to least restrictive (7 out of 7 items).

Respondent Sample
The study sample is 3139 licensed primary care physicians. The individual physicians
included in the study population are a subset of an expert panel of physicians maintained for
various types of healthcare research by SK&A Information Systems of Irvine California
(SK&A). SK&A is a commercial healthcare marketing firm that maintains a national panel of
physicians who agree to periodically participate in marketing research. SK&A procured their
initial physician list from the American Medical Association and other proprietary sources. 5
They contacted each member of the list to additional personal information, including email
address, and asked the physician contact to volunteer as a member of their expert panel.
Members of the SK&A expert panel are contacted at least two times each year by the list
owner. On each contact, the list owner verifies the physician’s personal and practice

5

Additional details concerning the list maintenance are available on the SK&A web site at
www.skainfo.com.
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characteristics and confirms each individual’s willingness to receive or continue to receive email
solicitations. Physicians in the SK&A list are not compensated for being members of the expert
panel. However, according to SK&A, more often than not, individual solicitations of the panel
involve some sort of compensation incentive for participation. The current study did not offer
any type of incentive to be a member of the study sample. The list was purchased/rented for a
two time use in this study, the initial survey solicitation and one follow-up solicitation.
Selection criteria for the study’s physician sample are physicians who practice mostly
adult primary care. Physicians who are certified to practice in the sub-specialties of family
medicine, internal medicine, or general medicine and licensed in at least one of the study states
met the criteria as adult primary care physicians. The primary discriminator in the sample of
PCPs was the willingness to be solicited for participation by email.
The physicians in the study sample represent a pseudo-random cross-section of PCPs in
the study states. The sample of adult PCPs is a 20-30% subset of PCPs practicing in the five
study states (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). Allopathic, osteopathic, pediatric, and obstetrics
and gynecology primary care physicians were excluded from the study population.
Data Collection
Each physician in the study sample received an initial email solicitation with a personal
message from the study’s investigator requesting their participation in the study. If there was no
response to the initial solicitation, a follow-up email request was sent ten days later. In both
solicitations, the respondent could immediately click an active link in the solicitation email that
would spawn the survey to their device or cut and paste the link directly into their browser of
preference. A respondent could complete the survey on a PC, tablet, or smartphone. All
functionality of the survey was presented in a format appropriate for the device. Respondents
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were allowed to skip any questions they choose and/or exit the survey at any time. There are no
risks or benefits to respondents participating in the confidential study. Each response received is
only used in aggregate with other responses.
The internet/online survey was created and administered using the Qualtrics electronic
survey system. Qualtrics is a commercial firm that manages various types of survey research
through a shared services tool. The University of Arkansas licenses the use of the Qualtrics
system for use by faculty, staff, and students. Qualtrics manages the mailing of survey
solicitations consistent with best practices identified in the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, which
specifies rules for bulk emailing. The Qualtrics system tracks the email addresses of the survey’s
panel(s) with an encrypted response ID to maintain the confidentiality of active and potential
respondents. While survey responses are confidential, they are not anonymous. The survey
management tools keep track of email addresses for distribution and response tracking. Data,
such as name and title, are associated with individual email addresses in order to personalize the
solicitation email message. Other respondent data automatically captured in the Qualtrics system
include: time to complete the survey, date and time of day the survey was started and completed,
whether the potential respondent opened the email solicitation, whether the email solicitation
was bounced by the recipient email server, and geo-coordinates of the internet service provider
where the survey was started. Best practices for data management, such as restricted access to
the PCP sample and response items, was used to assure confidentiality of the data collected
during the study (Dillman, Smythe, and Christian, 2014).
Data Management
Valid responses to the survey were captured and initially stored in the Qualtrics system.
Access to the Qualtrics system is secured through username and password validation. Response
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data in the Qualtrics system is organized in a spreadsheet like manner; rows corresponding to a
unique individual and columns corresponding to the individual questions in the survey. The data
from the Qualtrics system was downloaded in a common text-delimited file to the investigator’s
computer. The data file was opened in Excel and scrubbed of personal data incidental to the
study including the respondent’s email address, location, etc. The resulting Excel file was then
imported into SPSS V22 for data analysis.
Summary of the Chapter
This chapter described the research design and methods used to answer the study’s
research question. Ten hypotheses related to the research question are proposed. The population
and sample is described along with the criteria that are used to select the population panel. The
survey instrument construction is explained as well as the method of administration and data
management of responses. Each variable is described, including method of measurement. The
techniques used to calculate the scores for each variable is explained. Each statistical test to be
used is also explained. The goal of the study is to address the primary research question and
gather insights into the influences on PCP opinions about APRNs. The results of the study
appear in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four - Results
Introduction
This chapter presents the findings from the study. The research question is: Why do some
adult primary care physicians support independent autonomous provider status for advanced
practice registered nurses while others do not? The study evaluates the relationship between the
dependent variable, physicians’ opinions about supporting IA APRNs, and ideology, support for
the ACA, and several respondent characteristics. The respondent characteristics are reported and
univariate statistics are presented for the dependent variable and each independent variable. The
independent-sample t test is used to evaluate each of the study’s ten (10) hypotheses about the
dependent variable, using dichotomized groups from the study’s independent variables. The
outcome for each bivariate test is presented. The analysis generated significant results for three
of ten hypotheses at p ≤ .05. The level of support for the ACA on PCP opinions about APRNs
was a significant finding as were physicians’ ideology and whether they work with APRNs in
their medical practice.
Response Rate
Two solicitations were sent through email inviting PCPs in five (5) states to participate in
a survey about health policy. The sample panel was 2995. Table 4.1 presents the response rates
and distribution of respondents by state for the study sample panel. Two potential respondent
subsets for each state were arbitrarily constructed by the investigator for the convenience of
managing the solicitation distribution. Approximately half of the potential respondents from each
state sample were allocated to each “convenience” subset prior to distribution.
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Table 4. 1 Sample Panel Response Rates

Rejected

Valid
Responses

State
Response
Rate

Panel
Response
Rate

583

19

5

0.86%

0.17%

Arkansas

467

13

19

4.07%

0.63%

Louisiana

671

51

6

0.89%

0.20%

Mississippi

456

13

6

1.32%

0.20%

Oklahoma

818

41

16

1.96%

0.53%

Total

2995

137

52

State

Sample
N

Alabama

1.74%

Note: Individual response rates are rounded and do not sum to the total. An outlier analysis was
completed to assure consistency in the raw dataset. Case 6 was eliminated. Visual examination of
Case 6 noted a pattern of extreme alternating responses throughout the response set. The final
usable number of response sets with more than 75% of questions completed is 51 cases.

One-hundred thirty-seven (137) of the initial sample email solicitations were
undeliverable leaving a revised sample of 2995 out of the initial sample of 3139 (Table 4.1). The
initial rate of respondent’s contact from the solicitation is 2.4% or 71 contacts. Of these, six (6)
respondents indicated they were no longer in PCP roles and declined to participate in the survey.
Thirteen (13) surveys were started and abandoned. Partial results from the abandoned surveys
were discarded. As a result, there were 52 usable surveys for a final panel response rate of 1.7%.
Thirty-seven percent (37%) of the usable response sets were completed by respondents in the
state of Arkansas. Thirty-one percent (31%) of the respondents are from Oklahoma, with 12%
each from Louisiana and Mississippi, and 10% from Alabama.
Univariate Data Analysis
Table 4.2 is a univariate analysis of the dependent variable. The dependent variable, PCP
opinions about APRNs, is represented as a composite score. The composite score is created by
summing the score across twelve individual statements, Q5 to Q16 inclusive, for each
case/respondent. Higher scores of the dependent variable’s composite score signifies relatively
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less agreement with the statement set and less support for APRNs. The average score for the
dependent variable is 34.4 (SD 6.91) for all respondents. The mid-point of the possible range is
36, suggesting a tendency to support IA APRNs in the sample.
Table 4. 2 Dependent Variable Univariate Analysis Results
Support of APRN
∑ Q5-Q16
N Cases

48

Mean

34.4

Median

34.0

SD

6.91

Min Response

20.0

Max Response

46.0

Possible Response Range

12 - 60

Note: Larger values denote less supportive opinions of APRNs

Table 4.3 presents the univariate analysis for the composite scores of the two primary
independent variables, ideology and support for the ACA. The composite scores for these
independent variables were transformed into groups for comparison using bivariate analysis.
Three response categories/groups are created for testing group differences from the range of
respondent scores. Details of the bivariate analysis appear below.
Ideology is one of the study’s primary independent variables. It is represented as a
composite score calculated through the sum of questions Q36 to Q41 inclusive (Table 4.3). The
range of possible scores is 6 to 30. The average ideology score is 16.5 (SD 5.07) suggesting a
more conservative response pattern in the sample. The minimum response score is 7 and the
maximum is 26. Three response categories for ideology are created. First, a frequency
distribution of the scores for the appropriate variable was produced. The mid-point of the
possible range was identified (18). The SD of responses (5.07) was rounded to the nearest integer
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and divided in half and rounded (3) to produce the number of intervals to include with the
midpoint (16, 17, 18) and (18, 19, 20). The resulting class interval, for moderates, including the
midpoint is 16-20.
Table 4. 3 Primary Independent Variable Univariate Analysis Results
Ideology
Composite Score
∑ Q20-Q29

Support of ACA
Composite Score
∑ Q36-Q41

N Cases

48

47

Mean

16.5

31.5

Median

16.5

32.0

SD

5.07

4.44

Min Response

7.0

23.0

Max Response

26

40.0

Possible Response Range

6 – 30

10 - 50

Note: Larger ACA composite score is more supportive of ACA.
Larger Ideology composite score is liberal leaning.

The second primary independent variable is support of the ACA. Support of the ACA is a
composite variable created by summing the individual responses to Q20 through Q29 (Table
4.3). Three response categories for support of the ACA are created. The categories are
established using approximately equal response classes including the midpoint. First, a frequency
distribution of the scores was produced. The mid-point of the possible range was identified (30)
and is included in the new class. The SD of responses (4.4) was divided in half and rounded to
nearest integer (2) to produce the number of intervals to include with the midpoint (29, 30) and
(30, 31). The resulting class interval, neutral on ACA, including the midpoint is 29-31.
Table 4.4 indicates that 46% of respondents completed responses determined to be
ideologically conservative. Thirty percent (30%) of the respondents are moderates with 25%
ideologically liberal leaning. Responses derived from the “Support of ACA” composite score
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suggest that 51% of respondents support the ACA, 32% do not support the ACA, and 17% are
neutral. Sixty-four percent (64%) of respondents work with APRNs three days or more per week
(Table 4.4).
Table 4. 4 Significant Independent Variable Univariate Analyses

Variable

NT

Response 1
Label – % (N)

Response 2
Label – (% - N)

Response 3
Label – (% - N)

Ideology

48

Conservative
46% (N=22)

Moderate
29% (N=14)

Liberal
25% (N=12)

Support of ACA

47

Do Not Support
32% (N=15)

Neutral
17% (N=8)

Support
51% (N=24)

Work with APRNs

50

Yes
64% (N=32)

No
36% (N=18)

Note: Some numbers do not sum to the totals due to rounding

As seen in Table 4.5, 84% of the study respondents are male. Forty-six percent (46%) of
respondents are aged 60 years or older and 78% of respondents are Caucasian (Table 4.5).
Table 4. 5 Respondent Demographic Characteristics – Not Significant
Variable

NT

Response 1

Response 2

Gender

50

Male
84% (N=42)

Female
16% (N=8)

Age

50

35 or less
8% (N=4)

Age 36 – 45
16% (N=8)

Race

50

Native Amer.
4% (N=2)

Asian
4% (N=2)

Response3

Response 4

Age 46 – 54 Age 55 – 59
22% (N=11) 8% (N=4)
Black
8% (N=4)

Caucasian
78% (N=39)

Response 5

Age 60 +
46% (N=23)
Other
6% (N=3)

Note: Some numbers do not sum to the totals due to rounding

From Table 4.6, when asked if their opinions about the ACA had changed, 49% of the
respondents reported their current opinion is the same as it was in 2010. Twenty-five percent
(25%) of the respondents are less supportive of the ACA currently compared with their opinion
in 2010 and 27% respondents are now more supportive of the ACA.
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Table 4. 6 Respondent Univariate Practice Characteristics – Not Significant
Variable

NT

Response 1

Response 2

Response3

Response 4

Response 5

Change
in ACA
Support
over time

49

Less
Supportive
25% (N=12)

Same
Support
49% (N=24)

More
Supportive
27% (N=13)

Time in
Practice

50

1 - 5 Years
10% (N=5)

6 - 10 Years
10% (N=5)

11 - 15 Years 16 -19 Years
14% (N=7)
8% (N=4)

≥ 20 Years
58% (N=29)

Role in
Practice

50

Owner/Solo
8% (N=4)

Partner/P.A.
18% (N=9)

Employee
64% (N=32)

Contractor
4% (N=2)

Other
6% (N=3)

State of
License

50

Alabama
10% (N=5)

Arkansas
Louisiana
36% (N=18) 12% (N=6)

Mississippi
12% (N=6)

Oklahoma
30% (N=15)

Note: Some numbers do not sum to the totals due to rounding

Fifty-seven percent (58%) of the completed surveys are from respondents who had
practiced medicine post-residency for 20 or more years. Fourteen percent (14%) report being in
practice for 11-15 years, 8% for 16-19 years, and 10% report practicing medicine for 1-5 years or
6-10 years. Sixty-four percent (64%) of the respondents indicate they are employees in their
practice. Thirty-six percent (36%) of respondents are from Arkansas, a least restrictive scope-ofpractice state, with 30% from Oklahoma, a most restrictive scope-of-practice state (Table 4.6).
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 summarize the results of difference of bivariate means tests for the
study’s ten hypotheses.
Bivariate Data Analysis/Hypothesis Testing
Table 4.7 presents results for the hypotheses that were statistically significant and the
research hypothesis accepted (p ≤ .05). Table 4.8 summarizes the results that were not
statistically significant and the null hypotheses could not be rejected. For each hypothesis, test
groups were dichotomized from responses to individual questions or derived from composite
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scores as appropriate to the specific independent variable. Independent samples t test were then
used to compare mean PCP levels of support of APRNs across groups.
Hypothesis 1: PCPs who are more ideologically conservative are less supportive of IA
APRNs than PCPs who are more ideologically liberal. Mean for support of IA APRNs by
conservative PCPs is 35.6 (SD 7.50) and by liberal PCPs is 30.8 (SD 7.38). The difference in
means test indicates that the difference is statistically significant (t(30) = 1.68) at p ≤ .05,
confirming Hypothesis 1 (Table 4.7).
Table 4. 7 Significant Difference in Support of APRN Means Test Results p ≤ .05
Hypothesis
(Grp 1 - Grp 2)

NT

Group 1

Group 2

P Value
1-Tailed

Hypothesis 1
Ideology
(Cons < Lib)

32

M=35.6
SD=7.50
N=22

M=30.8
SD=7.38
N=10

p=.050

Hypothesis 2
ACA Support
(More > Less)

38

M=31.2
SD=6.27
N=23

M=40.3
SD=4.92
N=15

p=.000 t(36) = - 4.71 *

Hypothesis 7
Work With APRN
(Yes > No)

47

M=36.6
SD=6.87
N=17

p=.049

M=33.1
SD=6.83
N=30

t Test

t(30) = 1.68 *

t(45) = - 1.69 *

Note: *p ≤ .05. Distribution is normal with equal variances.

Hypothesis 2: PCPs who support the ACA are more supportive of IA APRNs than PCPs
who do not support the ACA. Mean support of IA APRNs by PCPs who support the ACA is 31.2
(SD 6.27), in contrast with a mean of 40.3 (SD 4.92) for PCPs who do not support the ACA
(Table 4.7). The difference in means is statistically significant with t(36) = -4.71 at p ≤ .05. The
null hypothesis is rejected and the research hypothesis is accepted.
Hypothesis 7: PCPs who work with APRNs are more likely to support IA APRNs than
PCPs who do not work with APRNs. The results reported in Table 4.7 indicate that the mean for
support of IA APRNs is 33.1 (SD 6.83) for PCPs who work with APRNs and 36.6 (SD 6.87) for
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PCPs who do not work with APRNs. The difference in means test indicates the difference is
statistically significant (t(45) = - 1.69). The null hypothesis is rejected and the research
hypothesis is accepted (Table 4.7).
Table 4. 8 No Difference in Support of APRN Means Test Results p ≤ .05
Hypothesis
(Grp 1-Grp 2)

P Value
1-Tailed

NT

Group 1

Group 2

Hypothesis 3
Time in Practice
( ≥20y) > (< 20y )

47

M=35.3
SD=7.20
N=26

M=33.0
SD=6.60
N=21

p=.108

t(45) = 1.25

Hypothesis 4
Role in Practice
(Empl > NonE)

47

M=34.8
SD=6.68
N=30

M=33.8
SD=7.65
N=17

p=.320

t(45) = .47

Hypothesis 5
Age
(< 60 yo) > (≥ 60 yo)

47

M=34.0
SD=7.07
N=26

M=34.9
SD=7.02
N=21

p=.694

t(45) = - .40

Hypothesis 6
Restrictive SOP
(AR > OK)

33

M=36.1
SD=5.87
N=18

M=33.4
SD=9.23
N=15

p=.161

t(31) = 1.00

Hypothesis 8
Changed ACA
Opinion
(More > Less)

24

M=32.4
SD=7.73
N=12

M=36.0
SD=8.42
N=12

p=.144

t(22) = - 1.09

Hypothesis 9
Gender
(Female > Male)

47

M=31.8
SD=6.07
N=8

M=34.9
SD=7.10
N=39

p=.121

t(45) = -1.19

Hypothesis 10
Race
(Noncauc > Cauc)

47

M=34.4
SD=6.55
N=10

M=34.4
SD=4.18
N=37

p=.499

t(45) = -.00

t Test

Note: *p ≤.05. Distribution is normal with equal variances.

Hypothesis 3: PCPs who have been practicing longer than 20 years are less likely to
support IA APRNs than PCPs who have been practicing less than 20 years. The results presented
in Table 4.8 indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. PCPs practicing 20 years or
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longer had a mean for support of IA APRNs of 35.3 (SD 7.20). PCPs in practice for less than 20
years produced a mean of 33.0 (SD 6.60). The t value is t(45) = 1.25 (Table 4.8).
Hypothesis 4: PCPs who practice medicine as employees are more likely to support IA
APRNs than PCPs who do not. Table 4.8 indicates that the mean support for IA APRNs for PCP
employees is 33.83 (SD 6.68) and for PCP non-employees is 33.8 (SD 7.65). The difference in
means test did not produce a statistically significant difference, t(45) = 0.47. There is insufficient
evidence to reject the null hypothesis (Table 4.8).
Hypothesis 5: PCPs who are younger than 60 years of age are more likely to support IA
APRNs than those PCPs who are older. The mean for support of IA APRNs by PCPs younger
than 60 years of age is 34.0 (SD 7.07). The mean for support of IA APRNs by PCPs 60 years of
age and older is 34.9 (SD 7.02). The results of the difference in means test reported in Table 4.8
suggest that there is no difference in the group means. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected
with t(45) = - 0.40 (Table 4.8).
Hypothesis 6: PCPs in states with less restrictive scope-of-practice laws are more likely
to support IA APRNs than PCPs in states with more restrictive scope-of-practice laws. The
support for IA APRNs in Arkansas, a least restrictive scope-of-practice law state, has a group
mean of 36.1 (SD 5.87). The support of IA APRN mean for Oklahoma, a more restrictive scopeof-practice state, is 33.4 (SD 9.23). The results of the difference in means test (Table 4.8)
indicates no statistical difference of means (t(31) = 1.00). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Hypothesis 8: PCPs whose opinions have changed to be more supportive of the ACA are
more likely to support IA APRNs than PCPs whose opinions have changed to be less supportive
of the ACA. Table 4.8 indicates the means for support of IA APRNs is 32.4 (SD 7.73) for PCPs
whose support for the ACA has increased and is 36.0 (SD 8.42) for PCPs whose support for the
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ACA has decreased. The difference of means test, t(22) = - 1.09, indicates the difference is not
statistically significant. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected from this evidence (Table 4.8).
Hypothesis 9: Female PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs than male PCPs. The
means for support of IA APRNs in Table 4.8 for females is 31.8 (SD 6.07) and for males is 34.9
(SD 7.10). According to the difference of means test the result is not statistically significant
(t(45) = - 1.19). There is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (Table 4.8).
Hypothesis 10: Non-Caucasian PCPs are more likely to support IA APRNs than
Caucasian PCPs. The results in Table 4.8 indicate that the means for support of IA APRNs is
34.4 (SD 6.65) for non-Caucasians and is 34.4 (SD 4.18) for Caucasians. The difference of
means test indicates that the difference in means is not statistically significant. According to the
t-value of t(45) = - 0.00 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Table 4.8).
Summary of the Chapter.
An internet survey was administered to a sample of physicians practicing adult primary
care in five states. The research hypotheses was accepted for three of the study’s hypotheses
about the research question. The null hypotheses could not be rejected in 7 out of 10 hypotheses.
This chapter presented the results of univariate analyses followed by bivariate analyses of PCP
support for IA APRNs associated with selected independent variables. In bivariate analysis none
of the physicians’ demographic or practice characteristics measured are statistically related to
their support of IA APRNs. However, ideology, support for the ACA, and working with APRNs
do suggest a significant association with PCPs opinions about IA APRNs, all in the expected
direction. In the next chapter possible meanings of these findings is offered.
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Chapter 5 – Summary and Discussion
Introduction
This study examined PCPs’ ideologies and their support for the ACA as influences on
their opinions about APRNs practicing independently and autonomously in primary care. The
primary care market is traditionally restricted to services provided exclusively by physicians and
as such, physician opinions about care delivery changes may be reinforced through belief
systems about traditional care (Weible and Sabatier, 2009). Ideology in the study sample is found
to be related to PCP opinions about IA APRNs practicing in primary care with conservative
PCPs less supportive. Similarly, PCP support of the ACA is also related to opinions about
APRNs with PCPs who are less supportive also less supportive of APRNs. These findings may
be of interest to state policy-makers as they consider IA APRNs as means of health reform in
their jurisdictions (Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Isaacs and Jellinek, 2012).
APRN care can fill a void in demand for healthcare services and access to primary care at
a reasonable cost which are pressing issues for state legislatures in the physician-directed
primary care system (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013a; Yee, Boukus, Cross, and
Samuel, 2013). IA APRN delivered primary care, permitted through state scope-of-practice laws,
is a preferred response to needed healthcare reform in 19 states (American Association of Nurse
Practioners, 2014; Safriet, 2011; Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). In other jurisdictions,
the decision to support scope-of-practice change may be perceived by PCPs as a repudiation of
their interests and deeply-held beliefs about the role of government and/or professional
responsibilities in care delivery (Keeter and Weisel, 2014; Weible and Sabatier, 2009). A scopeof-practice change to permit IA APRNs may be a challenge to accomplish in some states and
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without insight into how physicians can be convinced to support IA APRNs may not be
successful.
Health reform policy in the US is supposed to be about assuring the right treatment at the
right time for a cost that patients can afford to pay (Berwick, Nolan, Whittington, 2008).
However, the national debate surrounding how health policy can meet this challenge appears to
have denigrated to a stalemate of opinions between payers and lobby groups about whether
institutions or physicians should control decision-making authority at the point-of care (Deloitte,
2015b; Gilman and Koslov, 2014; Thompson, 2013). Discussions about care delivery seemingly
should include representation of “rank and file” PCPs to ensure their participation and leadership
in cost containment at the point of care, including supporting IA APRN care (Gerber, Patashnik,
Doherty, and Dowling, 2014; Heib, 2012). The implication from engaging PCPs in the APRN
change process is that physician leadership is needed to endorse IA APRNs as part of a durable
state-level health policy strategy (Angood and Birk, 2014; Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014). The
consequences of not considering the unique roles of all professionals in reform of the care
delivery system may include a return to the gross inefficiencies that spawned the ACA in the first
place (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011a; Link, Perry, and Cesarotti, 2014; National Conference
of State Legislatures, 2011).
Findings from the study are presented in the next section followed by a discussion of the
study’s limitations. Possible implications of the findings are suggested next. A recommendation
for future research is considered in the context of gaining support from physicians for IA
APRNs. The chapter ends with a perspective on how to engage PCP stakeholders in decisions
about IA APRN health reform at the point-of-care.

84
Findings
The findings provide a perspective on the antagonistic nature of heath policy in
conservative-majority jurisdictions or policy sub-systems (Weible and Sabatier, 2009). Liberalleaning PCPs have a tendency to support IA APRNS (Table 4.7) that shows their conservativeleaning counterparts are more likely to oppose them in the face of evidence (Cassidy, 2012;
Conover and Richards, 2015; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan, 2014; Oliver, Pennington and
Reville, 2014; Tillett, 2011). Similarly, PCPs who support the ACA are more likely to have
favorable opinions of IA APRNs while those PCPs who are less supportive of the ACA are less
likely to have positive opinions about IA APRNs (Table 4.7). PCPs who work with APRNs three
or more times per week are also more likely to express positive opinions about IA APRNs than
PCPs who do not (Table 4.7). These three factors were found to show significant differences
between the tests groups measuring PCPs’ generalized opinions about APRNs. Individual PCP
characteristics including age, years in practice, race, non-clinical role in the practice, and gender
are not related to PCP opinions about APRNs (Table 4.8).
The findings are similar to those from previous studies that examine the influences of
ideology on opinions, attitudes, and/or behaviors (Antiel et al., 2014; Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, and
Doherty, 2014; Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009; Schlager, 1995). Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and
Sulloway (2003, p. 339) suggest that “… conservatism stresses resistance to change and
justification of inequality …” for the sake of conservativism. Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, and
Doherty (2014, p 7) similarly suggest that conservatives who are steadfast in their opinions tend
to be “… critics of the government and the social safety net …” which might add some credence
to the study sample’s less supportive nature for IA APRNs by conservatives. Keeter and Weisel
(2014, p. 6) suggest that conservatives, more so than liberals, are likely to exhibit highly
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polarized views simply due to an issue’s support by groups in opposition to the conservative
perspective/viewpoint.
Considering PCPs’ support of the ACA and PCPs’ ideology may be important
distinctions for state policy-makers looking to gain clinician, public, and legislator support for IA
APRN policy programs and regulations. This suggestion is not unreasonable in light of cost and
spending goals related to national health policy. Reform strategies that are focused on costs over
physicians’ clinical decisions challenge traditional clinical roles in the performance of day-today patient care delivery and services consumption (Gruber, 2011b; Gruen, Campbell, and
Blumenthal, 2006; Office of the President, 2013).
Ideology is a personal characteristic representative of deep-core beliefs that are difficult
to change because of the role of pre-existing beliefs to “simplify the world” for individuals
(Weible and Sabatier, 2009, p. 196). Ideology also appears to be very much linked with group
identification, peer, policy, and political affiliation among others, which have been shown to be
influenced by opinions and attitudes especially as they are in contrast to groups with opposing
viewpoints (Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013; Merelman, 1969; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom,
2010; Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). There is evidence in the literature to
suggest that physicians’ opinions about the ACA should be considerations when determining the
incentives and/or disincentives related to IA APRN policy to assure an orderly transition of the
traditional care system to include IA APRN care (Angood and Birk, 2014; Federico, 2009; Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003; Matthews and Brown, 2013; Weible and Sabatier,
2009).
Factors influencing physicians’ opinions and interests are, at minimum, also likely
associated with care delivery issues motivating the need for reform such as cost and induced
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demand. The interests of physicians typically include a balanced workload based on their clinical
judgement, fair compensation for services provided, autonomous decision authority, and
independent practice environment among others (Deloitte, 2015; Friedberg, et al., 2015; Gruber,
2011a; Merritt Hawkins, 2014). Public interests related to IA APRNs include access to care for
newly insureds under the ACA, low out-of-pocket payments for patients, lower rates of
reimbursements for state budgets, job creation, support of state and community programs
through tax revenues they create, and payments for services based on care outcomes rather than
fee-for-service transactions among others (Friedberg, et al., 2015; Gilman and Koslov, 2014;
Gruber, 2011a; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011). With a predicted increase in
demand and combined cost increases through the foreseeable future, it is not unreasonable for
state policy-makers to focus on cost containment over issues of access and demand in care
delivery and miss the opportunity to improve the root cause of their escalating healthcare
expenditures (National Association of State Legislatures, 2011; 30 Million New Patients, 2013).
The current study brought together previously independent insights, motivations, and/or
influences from other studies on physician opinions and APRNs and, addressed a gap in
research. The gap is the relationship of ideology and support for the ACA as influences that
manifest PCPs’ opinions about IA APRNs (Table 4.7). It follows from these findings that PCP
ideology and support of reform may be the result of deeply-held beliefs about the benefits of
traditional care delivery that does not include IA APRNs, even in the face of objective evidence
to the contrary (Cassidy, 2012; Conover and Richards, 2015; Liu, Finkelstein, and Poghosyan,
2014; Oliver, Pennington and Reville, 2014; Tillett, 2011). Knowing these influences, state
policy-makers may be served by involving rank and file PCPs collaboratively about IA APRN
policy. Engaging PCPs throughout the policy process as practice reform is considered may be a
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beneficial strategy in meeting care delivery goals of state policy rather than asymmetrically
constraining their profession with legislation that potentially affronts physician self-interests and
beliefs (Berwick, 2013; Berwick and Hackbarth, 2012; Gerber, Patashnik, Doherty, and
Dowling, 2014; Heib, 2012 Ostrom, 2005; Sabatier, 1986; Weible and Sabatier, 2009).
Implications
Ideology and support for the ACA are found to be related to PCPs’ opinions about IA
APRNs (Table 4.7). These influences on PCP opinions about IA APRNs may help to explain
why some PCPs support changes to scope-of-practice laws to expand care delivery services in
primary care with IA APRN providers while others do not. More to the point of the study,
ideology and support of the ACA may be aligned with particularly salient underlying core beliefs
that may distort PCPs’ opinions about IA APRNs (Jost, 2006). Examples of core beliefs include,
but are not limited to: individual views on the role of government, beliefs about human nature,
priorities regarding who should participate in government, the way business should be
conducted, the role of central government, and the importance of the regulatory environment
among others (Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008).
PCPs’ endorsement of scope-of-practice changes is needed by state policy-makers to
assure the public and legislators alike that the transition from traditional physician care services
is reasonable to meet health policy needs in their jurisdictions (Gerber, Patashnik, Doherty, and
Dowling (2014). The health policy imperative for state policy-makers is to control the projected
growth in demand and costs for services as a consequence of “insurance for everyone”
provisions of the ACA and an aging high service demand population (National Association of
State Legislatures, 2013a; Naylor and Kurtzman, 2010; Safriet, 2011). These objectives can be
achieved through IA APRN policy if there is sufficient physician leadership to support a change
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in the status quo of care delivery (Angood, 2014). An understanding of the influences on PCP
opinions about IA APRNs can be used by state policy-makers to encourage acceptance of IA
APRN reform in the primary care system (May, 1992). Addressing core beliefs as heuristics in
opinion formation with physicians may be necessary, although likely not sufficient, for state
policy-makers to effect change in the traditional care delivery system to allow IA APRNs to
practice primary care (May, 1992; Sabatier, 1988; Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers, 2008). There is
also a suggestion that in some situations core beliefs may be modifiable through opportunities to
present related scientific evidence with a policy-learning approach illustrating potential policy
improvement impacts (May, 1992; McGinnis, 2013; Sabatier 1988; Weible, Heikkila, deLeon,
and Sabatier, 2012).
Core beliefs as basic constructs of PCP opinions may need to be modified in the context
of IA APRN policy. Given the historical roots of care delivery (Agnew, 1890; Stone, 1993,
1997; Warrington, 1839; Wildavsky, 1997), concepts of governance including one or more forms
of federalism, such as downward, upward, fractious, fiscal, catalytic, and dynamic among other
forms, may exacerbate attempts to change physician beliefs (Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013;
Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane, 2013; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). Federalism in its
various forms relates to the sharing of authority for the public good between central government
and states. As such, federalism may affirm physicians’ deeply-held beliefs in the face of
mandated and/or optional policy that is handed down to states through national legislation
(Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013, p. 4; Thompson, 2013; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014, p. 2). This
sort of policy interaction between states and the federal government is often referred to as
“downward federalism” when policy is used to stimulate state actions on national policy
(Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013, p. 4; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). Often, downward federalism
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may be perceived as a partisan “take-it-or-leave-it” action in state jurisdictions, perhaps more or
less so when ideological differences exist between state and federal partisanship (Calaghan and
Jacobs, 2013, p. 1).
Physician stakeholders may form defensive opinions and attitudes about policy through
their core beliefs especially if the federal partisan ideology is different from that of the state
and/or the individual (Federico, 2009). The current liberal-leaning federal administration may be
a confounding factor for state policy-makers’ attempting to influence physicians’ opinions about
IA APRNs (Lewis, Dowe, and Franklin, 2013; Ripberger, Song, Nowlin, Jones, Jenkins-Smith,
2012; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). There has been a tendency in the Obama administration
to use its administrative authority to bypass the U.S. Legislature when regulating care delivery
under the ACA which is a contentions form of “downward federalism” to many conservative
leaning stakeholders (Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). Whether the policy handed-down to
states is optional, such as with IA APRNs, or mandated, such as with the use of CPT 6 and ICD
coding to receive reimbursement, it is not unreasonable to project the perception by rank and file
physicians in some jurisdictions that supporting IA APRNs is an endorsement of federal
intrusion in local care delivery issues (Clark, 2013; Conover and Feldman, 1981).
State bureaucracies, including state medical boards which are staffed mostly by
physicians through states’ political appointments, may logically seem to be representative of
PCPs’ interests and should mediate concerns, but, in reality those entities have been shown to
represent the interests of the states’ political environment more so than the interests of rank and

6

CPT and ICD codes identify procedures, services, and intensity of care. The use of CPT
and ICD code are required on claims for any healthcare reimbursement from the Federal
government and private payers. CPT codes are owned by the AMA and ICD codes are owned by
the World Health Organization (WHO). The AMA licenses distribution rights for the information
content of ICD coding in the US from WHO.
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file physicians in some jurisdictions (Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013, p. 7; Federation of State
Medical Boards, 2005). Calaghan and Jacobs (2013, p. 8) suggest that a better predictor of
stakeholder acquiesce to policy adoption/legitimization at the state level is through
“…longstanding experiences with the federal government” which is a form of policy learning.
Policy learning is a type of education approach where intergovernmental interactions as one
element increase knowledge about benefits of particular policy (Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013;
May, 1992).
In states that are politically polarized with the federal government around a specific
policy or policy component, there may not be adequate engagement or interest on behalf of state
resources, including relevant stakeholders, to influence or be influenced in the adoption of
federal policy (Berwick, 2013; Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014).
Such a situation may be at least some of the reason, but not all that many conservative states did
not engage in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion programs, which like IA APRN policy is an
optional component of the ACA (Thompson, 2012; Thompson and Gusmano, 2014). As stated
earlier, ideological stimulated indifference toward federal policy adoption/legitimization at the
state level may be a missed opportunity to support health reform needs in their jurisdiction.
Knowing some of the influences on PCPs’ opinions may enable state policy-makers charged
with legitimizing federal policy in their jurisdiction to effectively engage legislators, the public,
and rank and file physicians in support of IA APRNs.
State policy-makers who consider the findings of this study as factors to be addressed
during health policy adoption actions may be able to identify policy instruments, incentives or
disincentives, to assure physician participation in meeting public interests over self-interest
(Ostrom, 1990). Physician self-interest is associated with ideology as a core belief for
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conservative physicians (Federico, 2009; Hardin, 1965). Core beliefs may be steadfastly
reinforced when the corpus of those deeply-held beliefs are challenged (Gruen, Campbell, and
Blumenthal, 2006; Keeter and Weisel, 2014; Ostrom, 2005; Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and
Sabatier, 2012). Merelman’s (1969) suggestion that cognitive factors related to ideology assist in
the development of partisanship through a process of political socialization is in line with this
reasoning. Jost (2006) posited a similar argument that ideology is related to the maintenance of
status quo contexts which may be the case suggested by physicians’ unwillingness to support IA
APRNs in the face of evidence that indicates: 1) lower cost of care delivery than physicians for
equivalent services, 2) increased access to care services, 3) jobs creation, and 4) equivalent
quality of care with physician care (Cassidy, 2012; Institute of Medicine, 2011; National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2011; Wiysonge and Chopra, 200). Federico (2009) also
suggested that ideology is a defining factor in opinion and belief formation and maintenance of
core beliefs which in the case of physician self-interest include: 1) sole decision-making
authority for care services, 2) ability to be “fairly” reimbursed for services, and, 3) discretion to
choose which patients they treat (Accenture, 2012; Deloitte, 2015a; Jackson & Coker, 2013;
Zismer, 2011).
What may be unclear to state policy-makers with respect to IA APRN policy is the
benefit to PCPs or advantage(s) to be gained by physician practices from IA APRNs. A study by
Antiel, et al. (2014) suggested that if physicians are unable to directly see benefits to them from
policy they are less likely to support it. PCPs who oppose the ACA might be disposed to oppose
APRN policy because PCP endorsement of IA APRN is part and parcel of un-realized gains to
physicians through that policy or perhaps part of spillover effects from their opposition to the
larger Act (Zismer, 2013). State policy-makers may be challenged when seeking physician buy-
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in for reform intended to ease fiscal issues through IA APRN policy that is not
viewed/understood to directly benefit physician self-interest (Wilensky, 2012).
Policy-makers could be enlightened and successful in their efforts by considering IA
APRN policy adoption strategies based on “policy learning” or education/information exchange
for physician and legislator stakeholders to “… understand the adequacy of government
decisions” in a reformed care delivery system (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133). Policy-learning can be
used as a means of understanding the dynamics of integrating stakeholder beliefs with health
policy’s goals and objectives in the context of expected changes to the care delivery status quo
(Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). The expected outcome from policy-learning
should be a commitment by stakeholders to engage in the policy process while simultaneously
determining stakeholder needs that can be integrated into a plan for policy adoption and/or
implementation. Policy-learning actions with relevant data become part of the knowledge base
policy-makers use when implementing other health policy features (May, 1992; Weible,
Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012).
Policy adoption at the state level after handoff from central authorities is accomplished
much in the way that agenda-setting occurred at the national level (Thompson, 2013; Thompson
and Gusmano, 2014). Interested parties, lobbyists, federal agencies, and the public express their
preferences for the policy to legislators in the case of funding or regulatory requirements or
directly to bureaucracies/agencies in the case of previously legislated authority (Weible and
Sabatier, 2009). Agencies and bureaucracies, such as State Medical Boards, interact horizontally
with other bureaucracies in their jurisdiction to gain support or opposition for the policy in
question from other relevant state agencies and/or bureaucracies. Typically, too, they may
interact with other states’ agencies and bureaucracies and relevant federal entities to gain further
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insights into the value/meaning of the policy including economic and political considerations
(Calaghan and Jacobs, 2013). To reiterate, state entities often gauge their support or opposition
to specific policy based on prior interactions with central authorities and/or other states (Berry,
1994; Berry and Berry, 2007).
Policy-learning “implies improved understanding, as reflected by an ability to draw
lessons about policy problems, objectives, or interventions” (May, 1992, p. 333). The outcome of
such efforts is to change physician stakeholders, the public, and legislators’ perception of and
opinions about IA APRNs delivering primary care in their jurisdiction. A common feature of
such policy-learning efforts is to assist physician stakeholders in understanding the consequences
of not supporting IA APRNs as well as the benefits of collaborative care, leveraged efficiencies
in the care delivery system, and shared patient care with APRNs (Link, Perry, and Cesarotti,
2014; May, 1992; Sabatier, 1988). The bottom-line gain for states through policy learning comes
from social benefits that are expected to accrue through re-positioning IA APRNs in terms of the
health policy needs of the state and the self-interests of PCPs. State needs that may be addressed
through IA APRN policy include: 1) lower gross reimbursements for care, 2) increased access to
services by enlarging the primary care provider pool, 3) increased and appropriate utilization of
care delivery resources, and 4) decreases in state payments for un-compensated care (Berwick,
Nolan, and Whittington, 2008; Mathews and Brown, 2013; Oliver, Pennington, and Reville,
2015; Safriet, 2011).
May (1992) suggests that policy-learning is useful in increasing the understanding of
policy objectives and re-framing/changing goals and objectives as needed to meet un-met policy
needs. The goal of policy-learning in the current context is to change and/or modify PCP
opinions about IA APRNs as primary care practitioners. The findings from this study suggest
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that PCP support of the ACA and their ideological leaning might be considerations for engaging
in policy-learning. Ultimately a collaborative approach, possibly enabled through policylearning, between rank and file physicians and state policy-makers is more likely to increase the
odds of changing scope-of-practice laws to permit IA APRNs (May, 1992; Sabatier, 1988;
Weible, Heikkila, deLeon and Sabatier, 2012). However, those gains will likely not occur, or
occur sub-optimally, if physician stakeholders perceive they must endure the policy change
rather than participate in a mutually beneficial outcomes from IA APRN policy (May, 1992;
Sabatier, 1988).
Study Limitations
This study and analysis face several limitations that may challenge the generalizability of
the findings to PCPs outside of the sample. Due to a low response rate, the results may not
extend to populations of PCPs in other states with restrictive APRN scope-of-practice
(Templeton, Deehan, Taylor, Drummond, Strang, 1997). A possible non-response bias may be
the result of respondents’ self-selection into the study as members of an expert panel. 7
Ideally, the study sample would include a broader distribution of respondents by gender,
age, years in practice, and management role in their practice organization. The independent
variables could have included additional PCP self-interest factors, such as business operations
and administrative considerations, to potentially expand relationships with the dependent
variable. A greater depth of understanding might be gained by integrating practice performance
data such as the range of services reimbursed.

7

Physicians who self-selected into this expert panel are PCPs who represent a range of
viewpoints on timely reform issues including managed care, care innovation, and technology
usage among others that are desired by marketing firms for evaluation of products, services, and
marketing messages.
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There may be sampling bias in the selection of regionally contiguous states from which
the PCP samples were drawn. While the choice of states was deliberate, the logic of regional
similarity may also limit the representativeness to PCPs in other states and regions (Berry and
Berry, 2007). 8 The five states from which the study sample was selected are all politically
conservative and as such findings may be sample specific. All of the study states’ governing
structure is bi-cameral with Republican control of state government including state senate, house
of representatives, and governor. The respondents were mostly conservative, 46% compared to
25% liberal which may limit the applicability of findings to populations with different
ideological compositions (Table 4.4). In future studies it may be useful to sample respondents
without the constraint of regional connections.
An additional limitation of this study is that the method of deploying the survey
instrument does not consider those PCPs who may not use personal technology communications
such as email or smart phones and may in fact under-represent important physician groupings by
age (Templeton, Deehan, Taylor, Drummond, Strang, 1997). However, this potential bias may be
minimized somewhat due to the ubiquity of the internet permitting response to the survey at any
convenient time using several types of devices (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian, 2014). The PCP
sample itself is a self-selected expert panel who by virtue of their collective expertise may not be
representative of the general population of adult practice PCPs.
The definition of primary care physician (PCP) used in the study may limit comparison of
the results with studies that use a PCP classification by a different authority such as American
Academy of Family Physicians (American Academy of Family Physicians, 2014). The definition

8

PCPs in the sample may be influenced by local and/or regional factors such as patient
population distributions, political affiliation, and allocated budgeting for primary care that were
not specifically identified in the study.
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of PCPs used in the study was based on self-reported sub-specialty typically representative of
PCPs rather than a distinct self-report of primary care specialty. There are no uniform standards
of definitions of primary care or primary care physicians. The sample of PCPs in this study was
derived from physicians classified by their sub-specialty which were then assembled into the
sample of adult PCPs. While an attempt was made to distinctly identify the desired subpopulation of adult PCPs, physicians by licensure and regulation are not restricted from
providing any type of sub-specialty services (Federation of State Medical Boards, 2012). Adult
PCPs identified in this study may in fact provide services through excluded sub-specialties or
other populations of patients.
Recommendations for Future Study
If indeed, scientific evidence may be useful through policy-learning as new/additional
information to modify PCPs’ core beliefs, then, evidence that addresses benefits, gains, and risk
of economic loss to PCPs may be helpful in states’ efforts to adopt IA APRN policy (May, 1992;
Weible, Hiekkila, deLeon, and Sabatier, 2012). It would be interesting to perform a historical
analysis of PCP reimbursement transactions to determine the scope of revenue and
reimbursement costs that would be lost and gained in PCPs’ practice as a result of IA APRNs.
There are many APRN cost effectiveness studies (Institute of Medicine, 2011; Liu, Finkelstein,
and Poghosyan, 2014; Safriet, 2011) from a service-level comparison basis as opposed to
directly evaluating changes in practice economics. No studies were found that look specifically
at the potential or actual reimbursement impact on primary care practice when shifting
transactions from physicians to IA APRNs. As PCPs shift low(er) intensity services from their
practices to lower cost APRNs, a reasonable question for state policy-makers to ask is: what is
the change in reimbursement outlay if PCPs provide higher intensity services more often than in
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the past? The reality of healthcare is that it is unlikely that a physician practice will see any fewer
patients per day and more likely is that their patient mix will include more patients with more
complex needs which are reimbursed at higher rates. Also, as more patients enter the primary
care system and have access to services with IA APRNs there is necessarily an increase in
reimbursement transactions through increased frequency of care.
Such a study would look at paid service codes and intensity of service delivered in the
status quo policy arena. The services and the amount of reimbursement that could be shifted to
APRNs from PCPs under an APRN scope-of-practice change would suggest the frequency of
new opportunities PCPs gain to treat more complex patients. As PCPs are able to more
consistently practice near the top of their license and reimbursement is paid for higher intensity
services, the paid reimbursement costs may increase to even greater amounts than before changes
to scope-of-practice laws. This analysis might also serve to illustrate potential shared business
and care models between physicians and IA APRNs in non-traditional care arenas such as retail
care, telemetry-based care, and continuous monitoring of chronic conditions. One cost that will
certainly be additive with scope-of-practice changes is the cost for claiming reimbursement or
“billing and insurance related” costs which in 2012 was approximately 13% of physicians’
practice revenue (Jiwani, Himmelstein, Woolhandler, and Kahn, 2014, p. 2).
There are a number of direct and indirect consequences that exist for states in choosing to
adopt and implement specific portions of the Affordable Care Act. The IA APRN issue is one
with consequences that will ripple through the care delivery continuum if non-physicians are
authorized to provide primary care service. For instance, the legislative cost perspective is
related to cost containment, access to care, and reduced rates of spending (National Conference
of State Legislatures, 2011). The clinical perspective in primary care is related to doing what is
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necessary to determine the best course of treatment for a patient (American Academy of Family
Physicians, 2014; Weed and Weed, 1999). By increasing the number of providers in the primary
care system through the authorization of IA APRNs, the number of transactions will necessarily
increase as will the costs of those transactions (30 Million New Patients, 2013). States that rely
strictly on cost perspectives as rationale to change state scope-of-practice laws may be
disappointed when failing to achieve cost controls in addition to improving access during a fiscal
budget cycle.
Summary and Conclusions
APRN primary care services in states allowing IA APRN practice have demonstrated
value to consumers and payers through increased patient access to timely and appropriate
primary care services with cost savings over physician directed care (Conover and Richards,
2015; Oliver, Pennington, Revelle, and Rantz, 2014). Not all physicians support changing scopeof-practice laws to permit IA APRNs in primary care and consequently their states are often
reluctant to proceed with that change (American Association of Nurse Practioners, 2014; Safriet,
2011; Yee, Boukus, Cross, and Samuel, 2013). PCPs’ opinions about APRNs in subordinate
roles are shown to be generally positive (Table 4.1). PCPs that do not support IA APRNs may be
motivated by perceived threats to their economic status and/or independent practice autonomy
which is linked with conservative ideology and lack of support for the ACA (Jackson Coker,
2013; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003).
One problem connected with PCP opinions about APRNs and states endorsing scope-ofpractice changes is related to physician collective choice. Physician collective choice is
essentially the choices an individual physician makes between self-interest, collective interest
(shared self-interests), and public interests (Ostrom, 1990). In the physician collective, there is
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relative impunity for the decisions that are made. A decision that benefits the individual or the
collective over public interests may have little negative impact on PCPs individually or as a
group, except perhaps that the status quo is maintained. Simply, some physicians may not easily
be motivated to support IA APRNs, perhaps because they are not aware of risks and benefits or
as a reaction to beliefs that are inconsistent with their own core beliefs.
May (1992) states that policy-learning is able to accomplish several objectives related to
policy issues. May’s (1992, p. 333-335) research suggests: 1) “Learning implies improved
understanding, as reflected by an ability to draw lessons about policy problems, objectives, or
interventions,” 2) “Learning can entail new or reaffirmed understanding of policy problems or
objectives” and, 3) “Learning can also be about the political feasibility of a given idea or
prospects for advancing a given problem.” This implies that policy-learning as tool for policymakers could be employed in some circumstances to reframe or change stakeholder expectations
such as with IA APRN policy goals and addressing physician self-interests. The policy-learning
process might also include an attempt to shift PCPs perception of IA APRN policy to one that is
consistent with ideological beliefs of physician stakeholders. This might be accomplished by
addressing arguments associated with ideology and PCP support of the ACA as a benefit and
physician gain rather than one that is strictly public benefit.
The findings suggest that PCP ideology, PCP support of the ACA, and their related core
beliefs may be instrumental in shaping and supporting their opinions about IA APRNs (Sabatier,
1988). While core beliefs are fairly resistant to change, they and other related beliefs may be
subject to change though new information. State policy-makers might engage physician
stakeholders through policy-learning approaches intended to provide new information related to
supporting IA APRNs and needed changes to scope-of-practice laws (Weible and Sabatier,
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2009). Part of the physician policy-learning process might include elucidation of opinions
counter to their own including those that are adversarial.
Collective action problems in healthcare can be solved if and when appropriate policy
solutions are presented in ways that meet, or at least address, the self-interest needs of key
stakeholders (Ostrom, 1990). Gaining physician stakeholder support for IA APRN policy
through a better understanding of the influences on physicians’ self-interests is a meaningful
reason why the influences of ideology and support for the ACA on PCP opinions about IA
APRNs should be studied (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013). It is important for national
health policy that its state jurisdictions understand collective actions about reform of the
traditional healthcare system. As healthcare spending approaches 25% of US gross domestic
product (GDP) the differences between policy-mediated physician takeaways and public benefit
must be adequately balanced (Kumar, Sherwood, and Sutaria, 2013, p. 1). In the current policy
environment, as long as appropriators of community health resources can operate collectively to
circumvent potentially beneficially health policy solutions, the negative consequences of those
actions will continue to compound to the detriment of patients and payers alike.
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Appendix C
Survey Instrument
Survey Instrument: PCP Opinions on Health Policy - April 2015
Q1 Required Information About my study: PCP Opinions on Health Policy - 2015"
My name is Michael Flanigan and I am a PhD candidate in Public Policy at the University of
Arkansas Fayetteville. I am requesting your assistance in completing a survey entitled PCP
Opinions on Health Policy – 2015 as part of my dissertation research.
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to survey Primary Care Physicians' (PCP) opinions on
health policy and legislated changes to the traditional care delivery system in Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: There are no risks or benefits to you by participating in
this study.
Participation in this study is voluntary. This study will ask questions about health policy,
including politics, nurse practitioners, current policy, and the Affordable Care Act of 2010. In the
unlikely event that any of these questions make you uncomfortable, please skip that question
and continue with the survey. You can also quit the survey at any time.
Confidentiality: No identifying information about you personally or your medical practice is
collected in this survey. Research records will be stored securely, and all records will be kept
confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Your responses to the survey
questions will only be used in conjunction with other responses in this survey.
Contacts, Concerns, Complaints, and Questions:
Principal Investigator: J Michael Flanigan, MA, MPH
Research Advisors: Dr. Brinck Kerr
Dr. Barbara Shadden
Institutional Research Board: IRB@Uark.Edu
By completing and submitting this questionnaire, you are agreeing to participate in this study.
Click “Next” to begin.
Q2 Which of the following best described your opinion of the ACA when it was passed in 2010.
 I opposed the ACA in 2010
 I supported the ACA in 2010
 I was neutral on the ACA in 2010
Q3 How supportive of the ACA are you currently compared to where you were in 2010?
 Less supportive
 About the same
 More supportive
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Q4 Which statement best describes your opinion about the ACA?
 The ACA should be repealed in its entirety
 Some portions of the ACA should be repealed
 The ACA should stand as it was enacted
Q5 Employing a nurse practitioner to provide primary care increases a physician's chance of
being sued for malpractice more than hiring a staff nurse.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q6 Hiring a nurse practitioner can attract new patients to a practice.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q7 Use of a low-cost nurse practitioner is unfair to other physicians in the area.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q8 Patients are willing to see a nurse practitioner for some of their primary care.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q9 Nurse Practitioners bring a different yet positive dimension of care to a physician's practice.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
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Q10 Nurse Practitioners should be allowed to practice independently in under-served areas.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q11 Nurse Practitioners can provide 80% or more of the primary care services of a physician.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q12 Nurse Practitioners should be allowed to prescribe commonly used drugs.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q13 Nurse Practitioners are not needed to improve access to primary care services in rural
areas.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q14 Nurse Practitioners provide lower quality primary care than physicians.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q15 Employing a nurse practitioner would increase a physician's time for activities other than
patient care.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
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Q16 Nurse Practitioners are practical as physician extenders when immediate supervision is
provided by a physician.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q17 In the last year I volunteered to assist in a national, state, and/or local candidate's election
campaign.
 Yes
 No
Q18 In the last year, I contributed money to a national, state, and/or local candidate, political
group, or political party.
 Yes
 No
Q19 From an ideology perspective, I view myself as .....
 Consistently Conservative
 Mostly Conservative
 Moderate
 Mostly Liberal
 Consistently Liberal
Q20 I understand the major provisions of the ACA.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q21 The ACA will address many of the problems in the current healthcare system.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
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Q22 In the next 3-5 years, capitation payments will replace fee-for-service payments.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q23 In the next 3-5 years, most primary care services will be delivered through hospital
systems.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q24 The use of "direct to physician" remote care services should be expanded.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q25 Retail clinics should be allowed to provide chronic care management services after a
physician has provided a diagnosis.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q26 Since the ACA was implemented; my practice has stopped accepting new patients with
Medicare and Medicaid insurance.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
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Q27 As a result of the ACA, it is necessary to practice defensive medicine.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q28 The US Healthcare System under fee-for-service is flawed and under-performing.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q29 Successful cost containment will occur when patients fully comply with their treatment
plans.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q30 Select your current age in years from the selections below. (Choose one please)
 age 35 and younger
 age 36-45
 age 46-54
 age 55-59
 age 60 and older
Q31 What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
Q32 Would you describe yourself as ..... (Choose one please)
 American Indian/Native American
 Asian
 Black\African American
 Hispanic/Latino
 White/Caucasian
 Pacific Islander
 Other
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Q33 What type of medicine do you primarily practice? (Choose one please)
 Family Practice
 General Medicine
 Internal Medicine
 Geriatrics
 Other
Q34 How long have you been practicing medicine post-residency?
 1-5 years in practice
 6-10 years in practice
 11-15 years in practice
 16-20 years in practice
 More than 20 years in practice
Q35 How many years until you STOP practicing medicine?
 1-5 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis
 6-10 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis
 10-15 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis
 16-20 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis
 More than 20 years until I stop practicing medicine on a daily basis
Q36 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President?
 Strongly Disapprove
 Disapprove
 Neither Approve or Disapprove
 Approve
 Strongly Approve
Q37 All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country
today?
 Strongly Dissatisfied
 Dissatisfied
 Neither Satisfied or Dissatisfied
 Satisfied
 Strongly Satisfied
Q38 Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
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Q39 Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q40 Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q41 Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing
anything in return.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q42 Scope of practice laws in my state should be changed to allow independent autonomous
practice by nurse practitioners.
 Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neither Agree nor Disagree
 Agree
 Strongly Agree
Q43 In which state do you most often practice medicine?
 Alabama
 Arkansas
 Louisiana
 Mississippi
 Oklahoma
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Q44 What is your place in the business structure of your practice?
 Sole Proprietor or Owner
 Partner or PA
 Employee
 Contractor or locum tenens
 Other
If Employee Is Selected, Then Skip To On average, do you work with Nurse Pr...If Other Is
Selected, Then Skip To On average, do you work with Nurse Pr...If Contractor or locum tenens
Is Selected, Then Skip To On average, do you work with Nurse Pr...
Q45 Does your practice employ Nurse Practitioners?
 Yes
 No
 Don't know
Q46 On average, do you work with Nurse Practitioners at least three (3) or more days per
week?
 Yes
 No
 Don't know

